Active Defence in Action: How China’s Military Doctrine Shapes Grey-Zone Warfare Strategies

China’s progressive usage of the Active Defence Doctrine and its strategic reinterpretation under the leadership of Xi Jinping in 2015 has given a framework to justify its growing and sustained aggression through Grey-Zone Warfare. Active Defence is no longer about being reactive to issues of contention, but is being used to legitimise and normalise coercion. This undermining of the deterrence framework compels nation-states to restructure their strategies to counter China's sub-threshold aggression.

Illustration by The Geostrata

THE ILLUSION OF DEFENCE

Grey-Zone Warfare (GZW) is an all-encompassing term that refers to actions falling between peace and war. The Grey-Zone strategies deliberately remain below the threshold of an all-out military action and work in a gradual but progressive fashion, allowing a zone of ambiguity and the capacity to fulfil strategic objectives with minimal escalation.

GZW can manifest multifariously, such as through finance, economics, propaganda, technology, psychology, international law, and the environment, among others.

Although Active defence as a strategy has been present since the inception of Communist China in 1949 (Mao Zedong’s Military Thought), it was only formalised in China’s Military Strategy of May 2015 as a strategy that provides doctrinal legitimisation for the use of Grey-Zone tactics to have a strategic high over its counterparts. China’s growing international standing and influence further reinforce its confidence in employing such strategies.

The Active Defence doctrine continues to evolve with the advancing and the emerging global security environment, but has traditionally focused on the ideals of a forward edge defence, having effective control, and keeping the war localised and winning it under informationalised conditions. 

There is an inherent paradox present in the doctrine: while portrayed as defensive, it also underlines the ideal of preemptive strikes if deemed necessary. Defence is not just defensive, but has an offensive element linked to it. 

China has given strong, conscious recognition to military modernisation, with the underlying belief that a strong military equals a safe and strong nation, which can “resolutely safeguard” its territorial integrity and national sovereignty unchallenged. The reliance on asymmetric warfare and flexibility has been and remains a winning formula. There is a need to employ a comprehensive 'total war' – encompassing diplomatic, economic, cultural, political, and cyber – to integrate different elements for a complete defensive strategy.

CONTESTING CONTROL IN THE SHADOWS

"As the form of war continues its rapid evolution toward informationisation", suggests that the use of information and technology is increasingly shaping war, and China increasingly views cyberspace as one of the new commanding heights of strategic competition. The pursuit of the Three Warfare Strategy (TWS) enables China to achieve its non-kinetic strategic objectives. The TWS integrates legal, psychological and public opinion warfare to counter accusations of cyber malfeasance and influence international perceptions to stall repercussions.

From 2022 through as recently as May 2025, China has been accused of a malicious cyber campaign by the Czech Republic for targeting one of the unclassified networks of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This act of cyber espionage has been associated with Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT31) (aliases: ZIRCONIUM or Judgment Panda), which is a state-sponsored hacking collective run by China’s Ministry of State Security. 

Last year, the USA claimed that the group had been allegedly involved in a campaign involving 10000 emails targeting high-level government officials, compromising government institutions, stealing trade secrets and intellectual property around the world. The UK, Germany, and New Zealand also allege years-long espionage activities from APT31.

China has vehemently denied any involvement by conducting technical analyses and providing evidence. This showcases TWS in action: shaping perceptions, denying culpability, and deterring scrutiny via psychological pressure.

China advances its interests through cyber sovereignty, where the government can control the usage of the internet within its territory. This censorship, also known as the Great Firewall or the Golden Shield Project, is designed to dominate the discourse and counter the other floating narratives, and has led to an imbalance in the game of narrative supremacy.

For the external boundaries, the Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative was launched to assist primarily developing countries in their surveillance technology, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, and building 5G networks, among other areas.

However, this could potentially lead to data breaches, continued dependencies, and a return to the case of cyber espionage. Some states, like the USA and even India, have taken action and put an end to or applied several restrictions on several technology and telecommunication companies of China. One such infamous example would be that of Huawei, as the company has faced several allegations of a lack of transparency and accounts of surveillance operations.

Despite the fact that Huawei and several other companies have pledged not to abuse or misuse the position given to them, one cannot ignore the past ambiguities and persistent threats posed by these companies. 

China, which could potentially be armed with all the gleaned information, gives itself a decisive edge in its conduct in bilateral and global affairs. The edge that cybersecurity claims to provide, and the space it actually occupies, are inconclusive. The lack of attribution to the perpetrator, implausible deniability, and the ambiguity that is deliberately cultivated make it challenging for states to counter or deter and of course, the cost-effectiveness, along with minimal resource utilisation. 

This informationisation reflects China’s approach towards modern conflict and preparing for new ways of war using its Active Defence Doctrine and GZW strategies, also empowering them to be more aggressive, all while not having intense escalations.

GZW has an array of shades, and Chinese strategies are highly adaptive, differing from region to region and opponent to opponent. To break this facade of defensive legitimacy and China’s rejection of the rules-based international order, nation-states need not only to build capacity but also to strategise the game of optics and narrative building.

The former could be harnessed by strengthening national critical infrastructure, thereby offering developing nations viable alternatives to reduce their dependence on China, especially around the Digital Silk Road project.

One of the most obvious measures states should take is a collective, coordinated stance and further strengthening alliances, be it bilateral or multilateral. With the support of international organisations, the nation-states could push back on China’s selective utilisation of international law.

For example, China has been carrying out military operations and resource mapping in Antarctica, despite the ban from the Antarctic Treaty System in 1959.

China has explicitly stated that land shouldn't outweigh the sea; thus, increased intelligence sharing in the maritime domain is crucial to counter the intimidation initiated, all in turn securing the nation’s resilience. 

Substantive measures have already been taken. In December 2024, the US House of Representatives passed legislation ('Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act') mandating the constitution of an interagency task force led by CISA and FBI to focus on addressing China’s state-sponsored cyber threats against critical infrastructure, therefore enhancing national cyber defences. Taiwan has also enhanced its capacity to counter cyberattacks. It now uses advanced technologies, including machine learning, for real-time cyber situational awareness to reduce ambiguity exploited by attackers.

The latter, China, creates a strategic illusion by often reframing its coercive moves as defensive or developmental. The popular characterisation of China as a “Black Box” due to its opaque political and decision-making processes can be seen as an intimidation strategy, which often creates uncertainty and thus leads to meticulous calculations of every single move made. But this could, in turn, be taken to strategic advantage as the most extreme possibilities could be taken into consideration, leading to a more effective and foolproof planning.

“Grey is the new black”, and China seems to be embracing it effectively. The Chinese Dream heralds the two centennial goals. The structural coercive nature of the Active Defence Doctrine gives China an optimum to conduct GZW, vindicating “Just Wars”. 

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BY A SHREYA LAKSHMI

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