From Responsibility to Rebuilding: Post-War Sudan Reconstruction and the Gulf’s Role

Sudan's devastating civil war erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hemedti. Sudan faces a challenge not to cease the ongoing violence but to prioritise the discussion on “rebuilding approach” in the aftermath of the civil war.

Illustration by The Geostrata

In the absence of tangible plans to rebuild infrastructure, revitalise the supply chain, and ensure access to necessities, including medicine and medical equipment, lies fertile ground for future violence. ​

Arab actors' role in Sudan rebuilding is paramount, not only because the region shares a cultural and religious identity, but also because it enforces the long-standing history with Sudan. The Gulf influence on Sudan stems from two factors: geography and power.

Sudan, at the crossroads of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa, positions itself as a maritime regional stabilizer, and the collapse of institutions could lead to regional instability. Saudi priority lies in the stability of the Red Sea, which has been the gateway of trade through the Suez Canal. UAE has secured its commercial interest in Sudan through ports, logistics, and reported engagement with multiple Sudanese power brokers. Qatar Islamic's adjacent network has secured a long-term interest in Sudan. These overlapping interests and competing plans of action ensure the reign of long-term instability in Sudan.

THREE STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES EMERGE IN SUDAN

First, the political economy of violence has been deeply militarised and compartmentalised between the militia and the military, weakening the state monopoly on physical violence, a necessary facet that contributes to stability and control.

Second, the structural problem Sudan faces in the 'political legitimacy crisis’ is that while the military has received tremendous support from the Sudanese majority, it does not dismiss the fact that the Sudanese military orchestrated coups against the Transitional government in 2021, interrupting the ongoing democratization process under Former Prime Minister of Sudan Abdalla Hamdok.

Third, a major hindrance lies in the diplomatic arena as RSF and SAF have received support from various countries vested in their strategic interests in the region.

ADDRESSING HINDRANCES IN POST-CONFLICT REBUILDING

To address these challenges, demilitarisation of the RSF is a prerequisite in order to achieve stability in Sudan as part of peace negotiations and is compatible with UN Peacekeeping Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration frameworks. With militia possessing arms and ammunition, it ensures the revival of violence in the future course of Sudan's history.

Dismantling the power structure requires nationalisation of gold mining, land ownership, and uniting the capacity of transnational trade under the state apparatus. Without strict conditionality, reconstruction funds risk consolidating wartime profiteers into post-war elites, as it has in the South Sudan case since its inception in 2011.

Creation of a unified political authority capable of receiving reconstruction funds and managing necessary allocation for capacity building requires legitimacy both among the partnering countries and civilians. In the absence of such arrangements, an elite-centric power structure risks excluding the civilian actors who led the 2018-19 revolution for the establishment of democracy and maintain the strategic violence through regional militias through former RSF members.

To renew the political legitimacy of Sudan, the role of Gulf states emerges not as a donor but as a strategic transnational actor. Historical evidence in the case of Kuwait 1991, Lebanon 2006, and Syria since 2024 suggests that GCC states' coordinated financial, logistical, and diplomatic support has added additional support to the state apparatus.

THE GULF ROLE IN REBUILDING

In terms of Sudan, Saudi Arabia's role as a stabilising security guarantor and the UAE and Qatar capital contributions can accelerate the reconstruction program, enabling these countries to revive, extending from the economic domain to legitimising political autonomy in Sudan.

With a divided political landscape and continuing backdoor diplomacy with conflicting parties in Sudan, consolidating a united global support is a predicament to realise, without cessation of hostilities. Western donors, Gulf states, the African Union, and neighbouring countries often operate through parallel frameworks, weakening accountability and coherence.

Tackling obstacles in Sudan's rebuilding necessitates an “elite centralised stabilisation” that can be realised through Gulf funding, prioritising security and rapid infrastructure repairs, bringing coordination to fragmented investment-led reconstruction where ports, agriculture, and mining zones are developed.

Followed by Gulf assistance tied to civilian government incentives, elites were to coordinate and strengthen the civilian government, bringing stability that had been undermined under Omar Bashir and has continued till today. This elite, centralised stabilisation deploys Gulf financial capacities and a civilian government tied to responsibilities, opening channels for political legitimacy.

In conclusion, the Gulf's role in rebuilding Sudan is a test of regional power exercised with accountability, a land of Nubia that stands at the verge of reproducing stability with responsibility under the civilian government.

With political reforms, Gulf assistance, and coordinated security guarantees, Sudan, a country affected by civil wars, revolutions, and military coups, possesses the capacity to become a regional stabiliser. Sudan’s rebuilding is not an act of Gulf generosity but the quest for dignity and justice that has been undermined by the conflicting interests of the regional power and necessitates a collaborative effort to reconstruct the post-war order.

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BY HARJEET SINGH TEAM GEOSTRATA info@thegeostrata.com