Still Addicted? Why the World’s Green Boom Isn’t Breaking Its Fossil Fuel Habit

Rapid growth in renewable energy and electrification is real and transformative. Still, it has not and likely will not, under current policies, cause a decisive collapse in global fossil fuel demand. Structural inertia, supply-side dynamics, rising energy needs in developing regions, pervasive fossil fuel subsidies, and geopolitical and industrial interests all sustain the usage of oil, gas, and coal.

Illustration by The Geostrata

Crucially, it is safe to say that the global green transition is uneven: rich countries decarbonise faster, while poorer, energy-hungry economies lag far behind. This asymmetry produces political resistance, investment mismatches, carbon leakage, and pervasive incentives that blunt global emissions reductions and slow the tangible decline in fossil fuel dependence. 

Recent international assessments caution that current policy commitments and technology diffusion are insufficient to keep the global temperature rise within 1.5 degrees celsius. This indicates the fact that transitions are political, distributive, and path dependent, not merely mechanical, technological processes. 

THE PARADOX: BIG CLEAN ENERGY GAINS WITHOUT COMMENSURATE FOSSIL DECLINE

Two linked realities characterise the current era. First, clean energy is being added at an unprecedented pace: record solar and wind capacity rolls out, and electricity systems are quickly electrifying transport and some industries. Second, and more alarmingly, despite these gains, global demand for fossil fuels will remain a large part of the energy mix for years to come under existing policy frameworks. 

Why is it hard to wiggle? The answer may be convoluted; supply and demand interact within systems that are moulded by past investments, shifting whims of the political economy, and uneven development paths.

Scaling renewables reduces the marginal carbon intensity of electricity; however, the equation remains faulty as it does not ‘automatically’ remove the entrenched demand for liquid fuels (aviation, shipping, heavy industry) nor the arteries of coal and gas, which still pump hard in too many countries' grids and factories. Multiplicity of uses creates persistent, durable demand even as electricity sectors decarbonise incrementally. Firms and states have invested trillions in extractions, refining, shipping, pipelines, and ports; all of which have multi-decadal lifespans that in itself is an incentive to continue extracting and using fossil resources.

To abandon these investments early entails addressing the thorny questions of standard assets, fiscal losses for producing states, and job losses in communities dependent on fossil economies;  political actors therefore face powerful domestic constituencies for maintaining fossil production and consumption. These dynamics, coined ‘infrastructural lock-in, mean that clean technologies, however promising they may be, must inevitably compete against an entire industrial complex designed around hydrocarbons. 

DIVERSIFICATION LOGICS AND SECTORAL COMPLEXITY

Energy transitions are never solely about emissions; they are intimately about national security. States, particularly those that experienced supply shocks during crises, prioritise reliable, affordable energy. Renewables introduce intermittency challenges and require grids, storage, and demand management systems that many countries have yet to ambitiously scale.

Thus, policymakers often pursue hedging strategies that preserve fossil fuels as a reliability buffer while incrementally integrating renewables. On the geopolitical stage, control of fossil resources remains a tool for influence: hydrocarbon producers wield leverage, and energy corridors determine alliances. The strategic importance of gas as a transition fuel is frequently invoked by both producer and consumer governments, legitimising continued investment in fossil infrastructure under the mantle of security and stability. 

As mentioned earlier, not all emissions are equally easy to eliminate. Aviation, maritime shipping, cement, steel, and certain chemical processes are technically and economically “hard to abate”.

For these sectors, low carbon alternatives are at various stages of maturity, but often come with higher costs, supply chain constraints, or need for additional infrastructure (eg, hydrogen networks, carbon capture). Even aggressive electrification will not substitute for hydrocarbons in many industrial processes in the short to medium term. Therefore, global demand for oil, gas, and coal persists because key sectors lack cheaper, scalable alternatives at present. 

Perhaps the most consequential reason for persistent fossil fuel demand is rising energy needs in the Global South. Millions still lack reliable electricity and modern fuels; moreover, urbanisation and industrialisation trajectories demand more energy. Even when renewables are cost-competitive for electricity, associated investments in grids, storage, and workforce development are significant. The result is a pattern in which wealthy states push renewables hard while many developing states expand fossil use to meet immediate development priorities. 

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION

The political economy of energy systems is defined by path dependency: past investments, institutional arrangements, and vested interests create inertia that resists radical change. Incumbent regulatory firms wield regulatory, fiscal, and narrative power; they lobby for stability, shape public perception of technological feasibility, and sometimes finance alternative narratives. (eg, carbon capture as a substitute for phase-out).

Overcoming the incumbency requires not just market signals but political mobilisation and redistribution mechanisms that transcend national boundaries. 

Energy justice scholarship reframes transitions through distributive, procedural, and recognition lenses. In order to be solidly effective and politically durable, transitions must distribute costs and benefits fairly, include the otherwise backseated communities in decision-making, and acknowledge the unique vulnerabilities of marginalised groups.

A transition perceived as imposed or extractive will, needless to emphasise, provoke resistance. In contrast, development and justice, when taken forward hand in hand, will build durable support. Therefore, integrating justice into transition design is not only ethical but strategically essential for its longevity. 

The diagnosis above suggests that purely technical solutions will not suffice. Instead, three interlocking policy directions can reduce fossil fuel dependence while making the transition more just and politically sustainable. 

Climate finance must be dramatically expanded and reoriented to support not just isolated projects but system transformations; i.e, grid, storage, industrial decarbonisation, and workforce transitions. This requires de-risking instruments, concessional financing for low-income nations, and support for domestic revenue replacement in producer states. Finance must also be accompanied by capacity building for project design, pipeline development, and procurement reform so that capital translates into bankable projects. 

Moreover, wealthy states and firms should adopt explicit technology transfer strategies, licensing joint ventures and manufacturing partnerships, that enable emerging economies to build domestic green industries.

Industrial policy can be utilised to localise value chains, produce jobs, and reduce dependence on fossil revenues. Where appropriate, trade policies (tariff adjustments, standards harmonisation) can support rather than obstruct the diffusion of clean technology. 

National and global transition frameworks are essential. At the national level, social protection for displaced fossil workers, retraining programs, and regionally targeted investments can defuse political resistance. Internationally, mechanisms to compensate or support fossil-dependent economies, especially smaller producer states and subnational communities, can align interests and legitimize ambitious phase-out timelines. Multilateral coordination is crucial; synchronised policy signals reduce leakage and prevent competitive race to the bottom dynamics.

Synoptically, it can be understood that the graph of the global green transition is not a linear arc from carbon to clean; it is a contested, uneven process shaped by various principles and praxis. Renewables are unarguably on the rise, costs are falling, and innovation is happening in real time. But these advances are insufficient to eliminate fossil fuels’ structural centrality in the short term.

Rather than treating the persistence of fossil fuels as a temporary glitch, scholars and policymakers must realise its political and distributive roots: infrastructural lock-ins, energy security concerns, industrial complexities, and stark developmental inequalities in capacity and finance. 

Addressing these causes often requires incredibly integrated solutions that combine finance, technology sharing, industrial strategy, and dynamic justice frameworks. For the global community to convert localised green progress into systemic decline in fossil fuel usage, ambition needs to be synchronised with pragmatic equity. Furthermore, it needs to be guaranteed that the costs of transition are shared and gains are widely distributed. Until this is materialised, the green transition will risk remaining a partial, fractured, and ultimately insufficient response to the raging climate crisis. 

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BY NAKSHATRA H M

CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE ACTION

TEAM GEOSTRATA

info@thegeostrata.com