Sheikh Hasina’s Legacy and the Aftermath: Recasting India–Bangladesh Relations

The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh goes back to the geographical and historical roots. Such relations are supposed to alter political issues, security matters, regional balance of power, and enhance neighbourhood relations.

Illustration by The Geostrata

The India-Bangladesh cooperation has been the most comprehensive in the last decade, particularly under the Awami League (AL) government, when Sheikh Hasina was the Prime Minister. During this time of strategic orientation between the two countries, a robust collaboration in security, connectivity, and economic integration emerged for the first time. 

Nevertheless, the relations were undermined by uncertainty in August 2024 when the unexpected fall of the Hasina regime under the pressure of colossal social dissatisfaction and growing burden of the army led to confusion in relations.

The direct transition on the fall of Hasina and recommendation of the Nobel Peace Laureate Muhammad Yunus as the transitional head has redefined India’s outreach to Bangladesh.

To the extent observed in the outcomes, it has established a mix of diplomatic opportunities and uncertainties in the post-Hasina world.

THE SHEIKH HASINA ERA

In 2009, when Sheikh Hasina returned to power, it was largely assumed that this was a tactical gain to New Delhi. Her government had emphasised cooperation in security and the suppression of anti-India insurgent groups like the ULFA and the NSCN factions, who had been taking advantage of the porous borders of the northeast of India for a long period. This crackdown was fused with high-level intelligence-sharing and elimination of major militant safe havens, and it made Dhaka a reliable security partner in the Near East of India.

This affiliation also traded into economic passages in which the pro-integrationist approach taken by Hasina led to the relaunching of the Maitree Express (Kolkata to Dhaka). The development of inland connectivity by water and creation of cross-border energy networks flourished and India extended a $7.362 billion worth of lines of credit to Bangladesh, indicative of Bangladeshi centrality to India's Bay of Bengal strategy.

Nonetheless, relations were not settled and during this golden period, even some agreements like the Teesta River water sharing accord were ephemeral, mostly because of objections within West Bengal.

More importantly, the launching in 2019 of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in India incited angst in Dhaka.

Although Hasina did not make any overt criticism, her government expressed its concerns on a diplomatic level as a result of concern over the demographic consequences and civil unrest in the border region.

THE COLLAPSE OF HASINA AND THE ENSUING CHAOS

By early 2024, the political situation in Bangladesh had declined at a terrifying pace, supporting popular resentment of perceived electoral fraud, economic disparity, and dictatorial methods, which sparked unrest across the republic.

The scenario worsened as protests became violent and a law and order situation arose amidst struggle between opposition, AL chauvinists, and security forces swept through major cities. Under immense pressure, both domestic and international, Hasina stepped down in August of 2024. She escaped to India and received de facto asylum.

Following her ousting, the military oversaw the establishment of an interim government composed of technocrats by appointing Mohammad Yunus as Chief Adviser to the Government of Bangladesh.

Although this support was not very strong, the transitional government initiated a wave of crackdowns on the followers of Awami League when it was competing with the resurrection of Islamist movements, which allied with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

As unrest increased in the country, the tensions spilled over to the India-Bangladesh frontier. Moreover, the communal conflicts in Sylhet and Tripura forced India to increase border security, terminate bilateral trade ties, and make a careful approach to diplomacy.

The dissatisfactory undercurrents in the relationship between India and Bangladesh left a vacuum of geopolitical opportunism, and China was keen to take advantage. When India experienced the diplomatic pauses, the Chinese invested in the infrastructure development in Dhaka and revived the BRI-related projects such as those in the ports of  Chittagong and Mongla. In the meantime, Pakistan boosted ties with BNP-linked Islamists, which was a strategic move to woo the Bangladeshi administration against India.

RISE OF THE YUNUS DOCTRINE

When Mohammad Yunus came on board in August 2024, it seemed to be a stabilising appointment; his international standing and his technocratic outlook attracted favour in Western capitals and multilateral organisations. The administration of Yunus positioned itself as a rights-based one and developed an inclusive methodology with a targeted institutional transformation. Nevertheless, this practice returned varying outcomes in the foreign policy of Bangladesh.

Being born outside the realm of politics, Yunus possessed only limited institutional relationships with India.

Rather than focusing on regional diplomacy, he was skewed towards the multilateral avenues like the UN, EU, and the Commonwealth to get wider legitimacy.

Nevertheless, India had always been suspicious of technocrats who lacked strategic perseverance, and it subsequently grew cautious of this reconfiguration too.

These implications were soon to be felt; a couple of the projects that were funded by India were reviewed and temporarily put on hold or were renegotiated. Whereas Chinese infrastructure deals were revived, particularly those in the logistics and telecom industries.

Bangladesh also expanded trade relations with ASEAN and the EU to avoid excess dependence on India. This move was economically rational, but in India, the diversification was seen as an indication of growing strategic detachment in the relations.

There was also a visible reduction in security cooperation, where the intelligence-sharing mechanism became slow, and Indian authorities were not included in meetings of border cooperation in most cases. In the meantime, Yunus' administration demonstrated limited interest in resolving the Indian concerns of the CAA-NRC fallout.

This was enhanced by his effort to mainstream the Islamist voices, which had largely been marginalised under Hasina on the basis of inclusive governance.

This changed strategy alarmed the Indian security agencies and threatened to put India’s national security in jeopardy.

THE FAULTS WITHIN BANGLADESH

With the interim government of Muhammad Yunus, who has vowed to reinstate democracy and bring stability in the political landscape, there is still a fragile progress. Elections had been repeatedly delayed and are now said to be held in February 2026, a delay that has sparked alarm in opposition circles and fears of democratic backsliding.

Although Yunus engineered his government as inclusive and reformist, minority groups are still targeted with more than 2,400 hate incidents recorded in a year that coincided with his rule. Activists claim that the government has been unable to contain this violence and that the government is even an accomplice to violence, hence its inaction. 

Concurrently, increased presence of Islamist elements, the relatively weak safeguarding of women’s rights and ethnic minorities, and the strongholds of unresolved law-and-order aggravations have exacerbated civic discontent.

Student leaders and rights organisations cautioned that the promise of democracy is failing because of an absence of substantial protections and proper elections within a given time frame. 

Although some Indian politicians boasted about a higher quality of life in Bangladesh than in India, a more detailed view provides a very different picture; there are great contradictions in such a strong claim. Women's rights are being directly attacked under the interim government of Yunus.

In another disturbing event, more than 20,000 Hifazat-e-Islam protesters assaulted the proposed gender-equal legislation, arguing that it contravened Sharia law, and there were reports of women being publicly beaten and mob attacks. 

The proportion of minorities is in a sharp decline as Hindus and other minorities decreased in proportion to the population, constituting 22% in the year 1951 to practically reducing to 9% at present, mostly due to persecution and ethnic cleansing as well and forced migration. On the economic front, Bangladesh is in the midst of a foreign debt crisis, and by mid-2025, it will require a bailout of more than 12 billion dollars by the IMF and multilateral agencies. 

REFLECTIONS AND THE ROAD AHEAD

India’s close alignment with Sheikh Hasina’s leadership brought a period of stability and enhanced cooperation in bilateral ties.

Her government remained a credible ally in promoting the connectedness of the region, regional security engagement, and facilitation of trade. This extensive cooperation was, however, accompanied by some constraints since its diplomatic policy revolved mainly around the Awami League.

By anchoring its diplomatic strategy largely around the Awami League, India’s outreach to other segments of Bangladesh’s political landscape, civil society, and security establishment remained relatively underdeveloped.

Such a limited format has become more evident during this transitional period, with the departure of Sheikh Hasina. In a changing domestic landscape in Bangladesh, India must recalibrate its approach. Simultaneously, shifting dynamics were likely to be more visible through the increased Bangladesh-China cooperation. India had previously considered it a possible long-term challenge, but now it is a reality in the neighbourhood.

Under every pretence, Chinese investments have expanded across vital sectors, including ports, telecommunications, infrastructure, and even defence cooperation, giving Beijing a strong economic and strategic foothold in the country. Concurrently, the gradual warming of ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan adds another layer of complexity to India’s regional positioning.

While political shifts have strained ties, India’s connection with Bangladesh runs deeper than leadership changes; there has been an inherited history that tends to affect the relationship between the two countries.

As evidenced in the immediate response that India showed to the tragic crash of the Bangladesh Air Force in August 2025, as they portrayed an act of lasting goodwill.

As Bangladesh seeks to become independent and multipolar foreign policy under its new leadership, the responsibility for sustaining bilateral ties lies with both nations. Bangladesh today stands at a crossroads where past partnerships and future alignments must be carefully weighed.

The steady arc of India’s support to humanitarian crises in Bangladesh, ranging from Cyclone Sidr (2007) to Cyclone Amphan (2020), as well as its vaccine diplomacy under the Maitri Vaccine initiative during the COVID-19 pandemic, exemplifies a pattern of consistent regional cooperation and gestures driven by long-standing goodwill. As Bangladesh explores new geopolitical partnerships, it must weigh them against the consistent, principle-driven support it has received from India over the decades.

It is time to make the shifts in leadership-oriented interaction to include and embrace a wider response by India, a response that takes into account the sovereign preferences of Bangladesh, and a response that allows greater institutional and civil society interactions, a response that develops sustainable economic and strategic interplay in multilateral efforts. This expanded outreach is necessary to form a stronger and visionary bilateral relationship with positive results, benefiting the two countries.

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BY SHRUTI JAGTAP

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