Why Mali Matters: The Sahel Crisis at a Breaking Point

The Sahel is a thin stretch of dry land that cuts across Africa. It sits between the Sahara and the savannas. The resources are scarce, and power is in a vacuum; these pressures pit groups against each other, making the Sahel account for 51 per cent of all terrorism deaths in 2024. Ethnic tensions run deep. In central Mali and parts of Burkina Faso, the clashes between herders and farmers are now more frequent. These fights didn’t just start recently - instead, they’ve worsened as arable land shrinks.

Illustration by The Geostrata

Because of this pressure, extremist armed groups step in, supporting one side or another. During conflict resolution, these groups gather fees instead in return for the safety and security of their property and community; offenders face severe consequences. Certain community members accept their presence due to the absent state support. Once established, such systems tend to stay.

Political conditions across the Sahel remain severely strained. Recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger arose from frustration with the weakness of security networks as much as crumbling infrastructure. Many of these Sahel countries gained independence but have lived with fragile institutions.

Borders have been drawn without consideration for local populations. Armed units have remained small in number. Remote zones have continued to lack links with major cities. The abuse of power has eroded public confidence in leaders. Key assistance has often bypassed remote communities. Therefore, radical groups have often seized such gaps.

MALI UNRAVELLED

The most serious issue is in Mali. Since 2012, there has been fighting against armed groups. Initially, instability began in the north. The Tuareg rebels wanted self-rule. However, radical groups took over very quickly. Then French troops intervened to help Mali reclaim lost territories. Even then, fighting didn't stop. Gradually, the attacks moved into the center-south of Mali and then further north into neighboring areas.

JNIM is by far the biggest of all the militant factions operating in Mali today. In 2024, followed by increased activity in 2025, they stepped up pressure on central Mali: Bamako was under growing stress. As a result of these efforts, the fuel supply lines were cut off. Transportation corridors were facing growing incidents. Assaults took place near key city zones. The group showed it could influence officials without direct clashes. Because data from core areas indicate JNIM controls key transport routes, prices for basic goods went up. Consequently, delivery of essentials became slower. Over time, people’s daily lives got worse.

The presence of Russian-linked factions added further complexity. Since Mali’s junta invited Wagner fighters, their influence has only grown. While they continue to defend the top levels of government, they struggle to be effective in remote field fighting. As a result, civilians often become wary of leaders due to brutal tactics.

The gap widened with the partial pullback, or repositioning, of some Wagner units. Shortly after this, JNIM made its speedy incursion into the area. Instability in Mali is infectious: the worse Mali gets, the worse Burkina Faso gets; the harder the time Burkina experiences, the weaker Niger becomes. In effect, Mali maintains a position of centrality regarding Sahel violence

JIHADIST ECOSYSTEM RIVALRIES

Two jihadist organisations operate in the Sahel: one affiliated with Al Qaeda, the other aligned with the Islamic State. Competition between them drives the local diffusion of violence. Rivalries have different impacts on regional security dynamics depending on the local context.

JNIM leads this branch of Al Qaeda; however, it refrains from arbitrary attacks. Instead, its objective has been to control the land and the people. Since it collaborates with village elders, relationships deepen through trusted go-betweens. Instead of simply battling, it combines violence with negotiations. The incremental result is greater influence.

The activities of ISIS in the region are controlled by ISGS. Implementing more brutal methods, it strikes populations en bloc. This ensures that people become displaced. Heavy reliance on fear is what keeps it in command. With a focus on JNIM, along with state forces, its objective remains the capture of territory rather than influence from the rear. These groups operate a prolific underground market. By charging fees to traders and herders in return for false promises in the form of security.

They’re involved in the illicit transfer of people as well. Besides that, they seize control over areas of gold extraction, a major source of income, these places crop up across Mali, along with areas of Burkina Faso and Niger. Money generated through gold serves to fund arms purchases, at the same time, young people without prospects of employment get lured in.

Some set up camp in forests or deserts and shift according to the weather, bicycles remain a common mode of transport to reach the target areas quickly. These young folk use strategies involving keeping a low profile, mingling and blending in with the locals, while using small drones or mobile devices to monitor state troops.

FOREIGN INFLUENCE, FAILED INTERVENTIONS

Foreign nations tried to change  how conflicts evolved in the Sahel. Project I-CT Shield. However, many attempts failed, and some pulled out slowly. A small number extended operations even as security declined.

France fought radical groups for a decade. Public frustration mounted, however, after early success in stemming major attacks; many started seeing the country's role as worsening unrest. Consequently, they pulled back. Following their exit, flaws emerged in air support along with logistics networks. 

Tensions with Niger's military rulers have triggered a review of the role of American assistance, and the future still remains unclear. Without American intel backing, nations lose a vital tool. First, it was Russia that entered through Wagner, followed by the Africa Corps. Regional groups struggled: Even though they were initially very strong, the G5 Sahel founded in 2014 as a regional, intergovernmental organization to promote the effective use of INTERPOL policing capabilities in the member countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. slowly lost steam.

Mali’s 2022 exit removed the bulk of joint force deployment zones and cross-border intelligence sharing, while sanctions on coup-led regimes in Burkina Faso and Niger froze EU and France-backed security financing.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) slowed down as a result of the coups. UN troops withdrew from Mali altogether.  With ECOWAS crisis-management mechanisms paralysed and MINUSMA’s withdrawal eliminating logistical and air-support capacity, coordinated counterterror operations became structurally impossible.

PATH AHEAD

The Sahel crisis can be expected to spread beyond the current borders. The shifts to countries like Benin, Togo, or Ghana could occur gradually. The involvement of outside powers can grow incrementally over time. Major trade routes across Africa can break down due to this pressure. What happens next depends on the choices made by leaders in the near term.

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BY CHIRAG JOSHI

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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