Deterrence by Punishment: The Indian Approach

The global security and modern-day geopolitical landscape is increasingly defined by the sophisticated challenge of deterring hybrid warfare and state-sponsored terrorism, a problem acutely felt in the nuclear-shadowed rivalry between India and Pakistan.

Illustration by The Geostrata

For decades, India’s approach has been to follow a traditional military strategy focused on preventing attacks through sheer defense and maintaining its intelligence networks. Yet the character of unwanted asymmetric threats calls for a tougher punishment, one that must be included in the equation while dealing with a rogue state like Pakistan.

As you are aware, necessity is the mother of invention. This necessity with Pakistan has driven India to unequivocally abandon its doctrine of strategic restraint and adopt the logic of Deterrence by Punishment in a larger worldview. This doctrine believes that peace is best preserved not by defending every inch of ground but by ensuring that any hostile act, no matter how minor, will ignite a cost so great and agonizing that the aggressor is forced to exercise restraint.

Understanding this doctrine is vital for analyzing the recent change in New Delhi's policy towards Islamabad, which has transformed any cross-border provocations into grounds for assured and costly retribution.

WHAT IS DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT?

Deterrence by Punishment is a security policy under which a state deters an enemy from committing any act of aggression that undermines the peace by making the punishment for attacking unacceptably painful.

This strategy works by ensuring that any act of aggression will trigger a guaranteed, devastating counter-response, inflicting costs, be it military, economic, or political, so unacceptable that they outweigh any potential benefit the adversary might gain.

The policy means that an initial hostile act will trigger a guaranteed, disproportionate counter-response designed to impose costs so severe that they outweigh any anticipated benefit of the initial attack itself. The primary goal of this theory isn’t to stop the initial transgression directly, but to control the adversary's final decision by making the consequences of crossing a "red line" so devastating that the original aggression can never be logically justified.

While the core idea that punishment prevents crime is as old as civilization, formalized by enlightenment thinkers like Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham while its modern, distinct application to state strategy was the work of Thomas C. Schelling in the 1960s. Schelling showed that in the nuclear age, the power to hurt was a more decisive diplomatic tool than the power to conquer.

A classic example of nuclear deterrence by deterrence by punishment is the "Dead Hand" system deployed by Russia in case of a nuclear strike. Even if the Russian chain of command is taken down, the Dead Hand can determine if a nuclear attack has taken place and can retaliate by launching nuclear weapons without the need for any human interference. Thus, making the consequence of wiping out the Russian leadership so deadly that it would destroy the world, bringing in nuclear winter.

INDIA-PAKISTAN DYNAMICS

One of the most consequential rivalries of the 21st century, often described as the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoint, is the bitter conflict between India and Pakistan. Born out of the blood-soaked partition of 1947, when neighbors became enemies overnight and families were torn apart by midnight lines, the shadow of that trauma still lingers.

The early decades after independence saw three wars (1947–48, 1965, and 1971), each reshaping their strategic perceptions. Following the 1971 war, Pakistan’s defeat deeply affected its morale as a nation, pushing it to realize that it was no match for India’s conventional superiority. This defeat reshaped Pakistan’s complete security structure. Pakistan’s defeat completely changed the warfare dynamic in the region, with Pakistan switching to an asymmetric warfare strategy to counter India’s conventional superiority.

Pakistan institutionalized a form of proxy warfare that operated deliberately below the nuclear threshold. This approach, often referred to as the strategy of "bleeding India with a thousand cuts," sought to exploit India’s doctrinal restraint and its hesitation to escalate limited provocations into full-scale conflict. It began by utilizing state-sponsored non-state actors for waging cross-border terrorism starting in the region of Punjab during the 1980s and then shifting to Kashmir and elsewhere.

In essence, Pakistan aimed to offset its conventional disadvantages by keeping India constantly engaged in a cycle of low-intensity conflicts, thus exploiting India's reluctance to escalate conflicts and its adherence to a strategy of Strategic Restraint.

The Kargil War (1999), which came just after both nations declared themselves nuclear powers, was a major turning point. It showed that Pakistan was ready to use its nuclear arsenal as a shield for promoting cross-border terrorism. This resulted in multiple terror attacks across the length and breadth of the nation. India was forced to absorb major terror attacks (such as the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks) without any action against these unprovoked aggressions by non-state actors from Pakistan.

Since military response was constrained, this restraint allowed Pakistan to believe its sub-conventional warfare technique of proxy warfare could flourish and remain immune under its nuclear shield.

INDIA'S PIVOT TO ASSURED PUNISHMENT

Patience has its limits, and it finally gave in when decades-long restraint and diplomatic talks were rendered useless. With cross-border terrorism reaching its peak and terrorist attacks becoming a common phenomenon all across the country, and strategic restraint not yielding any results except for some diplomatic pressure and low-level denial. This frustration led to India actively shifting towards a Deterrence-by-Punishment (D-by-P) posture emerged as a direct response to deter Pakistan’s persistent provocations.

After years of absorbing countless asymmetric attacks under the shadow of nuclear deterrence, India made a calculated decision to finally break the pattern and to shatter the “nuclear shield” once and for all that had long protected Pakistan’s strategy of proxy warfare.

This transformation marked a decisive shift in India’s national security doctrine: deterrence would now be achieved not by denial or diplomacy, but through assured, visible, and proportional punishment. This was India’s way of saying to its adversaries that “Actions will have equal or more than proportionate consequences.”

THE STARTING GUN: URI (2016)

Four militants from the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) and targeted the Indian Army brigade headquarters in Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in the death of 19 soldiers. The martyrdom of 19 soldiers in the terrorist attack in Uri in 2016 marked the beginning of India’s new approach.

In the wake of this loss, public outrage and strategic frustration pushed New Delhi to adopt a more assertive posture. India responded with surgical strikes across the LoC, targeting multiple terror launchpads used for infiltration. This was a calibrated military operation, not a symbolic reprisal. The operation signaled India’s willingness to raise the cost of Pakistan’s proxy warfare while maintaining control below the nuclear threshold.

In these attacks, India made it clear that it was willing to cross the LoC and hit deep inside PoK to dismantle terror infrastructure, thereby introducing the first element of assured punishment.

RAISING THE STAKES: BALAKOT (2019)

In February 2019, a suicide bomber rammed an explosive-laden vehicle into a convoy of CRPF personnel in Pulwama, Kashmir, killing 40 soldiers, resulting in the worst attack on Indian security forces in decades. This ghastly terror attack shook the nation to its core, with a deep sentiment of anger and the hunger for a response much greater than expected.

In response to the Pulwama terrorist attack, India launched the Balakot Airstrike, striking a Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp deep inside Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, well beyond the LoC, crossing the international border. It was the first time since 1971 that Indian jets had crossed into Pakistani airspace. By striking a terrorist training camp deep inside Pakistani territory, India demonstrated the political will to breach previous escalation boundaries and impose costs on the sponsors and infrastructure of terrorism within the mainland. 

MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT: OPERATION SINDOOR (2025)

The complete realization of the Deterrence by punishment strategy came with Operation Sindoor following the 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack, which killed 26 innocent tourists. This was a multidimensional operation designed to impose maximum costs on Pakistan.

It started with India putting the long-standing Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance. 

This was the first time India suspended the treaty, which had stayed intact even after 4 wars with Pakistan.

This was followed by Operation Sindoor, where the Indian Armed Forces carried out precision missile and air strikes on 9 terror camps across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

In a kinetic response to Pakistan's retaliation to these precision strikes on terror camps, India retaliated by bombing 11 Pakistani airbases and nuclear facilities.

Thus, handicapping Pakistan completely. This was a clear signal to Pakistan that “Nuclear Blackmail” won’t work with India anymore, and India was ready to take any steps necessary to safeguard its interests.

FORMALIZING THE NEW DETERRENT DOCTRINE

With the cessation of violence on May 10, 2025, following the culmination of Operation Sindoor 1.0, India made it clear that it would be adopting a brand new strategic posture. The policy outlined that any future terrorist attack on Indian territory would be interpreted as an act of war, effectively eliminating the long-standing ambiguity between terrorism and conventional aggression.

This statement serves as the ultimate deterrent, clear, uncompromising, and strategically unambiguous. By establishing terrorism as a direct trigger for a full-spectrum military response, India signaled the end of strategic restraint as a default approach. By removing the grey zone between terrorism and conventional aggression, India effectively established a high-stakes tripwire: any act of terror now risks triggering a full-spectrum response as it did in Operation Sindoor.

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BY JYOTIRADITYA SHETTY

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