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After the BNP Landslide: Can India and Bangladesh Reset Their Strategic Compact?

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s sweeping electoral victory has inevitably triggered a familiar question in New Delhi’s strategic circles: what does a BNP-led Dhaka mean for India?

After the BNP Landslide: Can India and Bangladesh Reset Their Strategic Compact?

Illustration by The Geostrata


The concern is not hollow, as memories of strained ties during the earlier BNP rule remain fresh in the minds of experts and people alike. But geopolitics rarely allows countries the luxury of nostalgia. Today’s world, where alliances are changing at an unprecedented speed, regional realities demand pragmatism over prejudice much more than before. 


A POLITICAL SHIFT YEARS IN THE MAKING


Since the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 following widespread protests, the momentum had clearly tilted toward the BNP. The party’s eventual landslide is thus no surprise. 


With Khaleda Zia no longer in the picture, leadership has consolidated around Tarique Rahman, who now emerges as the central figure in Bangladesh’s political landscape. However, the story of this election is not limited to the BNP’s resurgence. Equally crucial has been the remarkable rise of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, whose political footprint has expanded dramatically. This possibly hints at a shift in Bangladesh’s ideological balance. 


WHY THE PAST STILL MATTERS?: INDIA IS NO STRANGER TO THE BNP


The relationship dates back to 1978, when General Ziaur Rahman founded the party. After his assassination, Khaleda Zia took charge, steering Bangladesh through periods that often saw friction with New Delhi.


The most difficult phase arguably came between 2001 and 2006, during the BNP–Jamaat coalition government.

For India, the period was marked by deep security concerns as Insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast reportedly found sanctuary across the border, while extremist networks were believed to function with relative impunity. Elements within the ruling coalition turned a blind eye. This led to erosion of trust, and the bilateral relationship drifted into suspicion.


THE HASINA INTERLUDE - A STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION


It was from this low point that India–Bangladesh ties witnessed one of South Asia’s most remarkable diplomatic recoveries. When Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2008, her government launched a decisive crackdown on insurgent groups targeting India.


This marked the beginning of robust counterterrorism cooperation and transformed Bangladesh from a perceived security concern into one of India’s most reliable regional partners.


More importantly, a political understanding took root: stable relations were mutually beneficial.

A CHANGED POLITICAL LANDSCAPE


Hasina’s fall has reopened the political arena, allowing the BNP and Jamaat, long constrained by the Awami League’s dominance, to reclaim space. Naturally, this transition has prompted speculation about whether the clock might turn back. Yet India’s response suggests otherwise.


Prime Minister Narendra Modi was swift to congratulate Tarique Rahman, publicly affirming India’s support for a “democratic, progressive, and inclusive Bangladesh.” 

This was not an isolated gesture.


In a notable display of political maturity, Dr Jaishankar travelled to Bangladesh to convey condolences upon the passing of Khaleda Zia, BNP’s most foundational leader and the mother of Tarique Rehman. 


The message is unmistakable: India is prepared to engage whoever the people of Bangladesh choose. 

If proof of this evolving doctrine were needed, one need only look westward. Few would have predicted a working relationship between India and the Taliban after America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yet strategic necessity compelled engagement, and today, India maintains more functional channels with Kabul than many expected.


The lesson is simple: foreign policy is guided less by sentiment and more by realism.


THE ROAD AHEAD: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES


Where, then, does the relationship go from here? Only time will tell; however, we can surely make some calculated predictions. Several variables will shape its trajectory.


First is the politically sensitive presence of Sheikh Hasina in India, which could periodically test Dhaka’s domestic optics.


Second is China. To what extent Bangladesh will play ball with China remains to be seen. Bangladesh has steadily deepened economic ties with Beijing, and the extent to which the new BNP government leans into that partnership will be closely watched in New Delhi.

However, focusing solely on risks misses the larger structural reality: India and Bangladesh are bound by far more than government-to-government ties. We share history, culture, geography, transboundary rivers, and maritime neighbourhoods. Our economies are increasingly interlinked, and their security environments overlap. In short, geography alone makes disengagement impossible.


TRADE AS A STABILISER


If one factor is most likely to anchor the relationship, it is trade. Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, with cooperation spanning textiles, energy, infrastructure, and connectivity. For Dhaka, continued economic growth depends heavily on stable external partnerships, and India remains indispensable in that equation. Prosperity, after all, is a powerful moderating force. A government focused on economic delivery is unlikely to jeopardise one of its most important commercial relationships.


The temptation in moments of political transition is to assume disruption. But statecraft rewards patience. Rather than viewing the BNP’s victory through the lens of past distrust, India appears to be approaching the new dispensation with cautious optimism.


The world is entering an era of heightened great-power competition, fragile supply chains, and evolving security threats. In such a landscape, cooperative neighbourhoods are not optional; they are strategic necessities. The India–Bangladesh partnership has survived ideological swings before. There is little reason to assume it cannot adapt again.


For now, the smartest course for both sides is clear: we must engage and let shared interests outweigh inherited suspicions.


CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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