Voice for the Voiceless: Over Seven Decades of Struggle with China for My Land and My People - A Book Review

‘If China wants Tibet to stay with China, then China must create the necessary conditions for this. The time has come now for the Chinese to show the way for Tibet and China to live together in friendship’ ~ His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama

The life of the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, can to a great extent be viewed as a first-hand history of relations between the People’s Republic of China and the erstwhile Free State of Tibet, now the Xizang or Tibet Autonomous Region. 

Illustration by The Geostrata

As the last temporal head of a ‘free Tibet’, before it fell under the influence of the Chinese State in 1950, the 14th Dalai Lama’s perspectives are important sources in analysing the historical, cultural, socio-political, and economic dynamics of the region since the mid- 20th Century, understanding them from the point of view of a man who has been an integral part of these aspects and in many ways the Tibetan self-identity.

The experiences of the Dalai Lama reflect not only on almost a century of shared Tibetan narratives but also on the People’s Republic of China’s changing engagements as a major world power and the evolution of international stances vis-à-vis negotiations of the ‘Tibet Question’.

His latest book ‘Voice for the Voiceless: Over Seven Decades of Struggle with China for My Land and My People’ adds to these narratives from the dual standpoint of an influential socio-cultural and political leader and as the head of a spiritual order committed to peace amidst the state of turmoil that marked Sino-Tibetan relations during the 1950s - barely weeks after his investiture - and the tensions that have persisted since.

Although brief from the point of building the history of nations, this book provides an intimate and invaluable insight into the Dalai Lama’s personal history, thoughts, and ideologies.

While identifying socio-political and territorial negotiations between Colonial Britain and Russia as a major factor in influencing Sino-Tibetan relations during the ‘Great Game’, the Dalai Lama believes that it was the crisis precipitated by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung’s geopolitical interests, coupled with revanchist goals, that facilitated both his appointment and ouster from the Tibetan state’s highest office. 

It is the purpose of this office - to protect the Tibetan people, society, and culture - that dictated the newly-invested Dalai Lama’s further negotiations with the Communist Government and has continued to direct his campaign for a ‘free Tibet’ for over 70 years. He claimed that apart from oppressing every facet of Tibetan existence, the Chinese State’s emphasis on development has had pernicious effects on the fragile Himalayan ecosystem.

The Dalai Lama’s choice of title for his book, Voice of the Voiceless, reflects this cause, to both restore the agency and freedom of a long-oppressed community and save Tibet’s socio-cultural and physical landscapes from the effects of Beijing’s politically and economically motivated rule.

The desire to create a system of societal equity and to facilitate lasting change in the prevailing social order is one that he identifies as among his primary motivations and a factor that he attempted to place at the forefront of his negotiations with Chinese leaders like Chairman Mao.However, he claims that these experiences made it clear that the ambitions of the modern Chinese State are incompatible with both Tibetan Culture and the tenets of Buddhism.

He thus recounts a story that has been told in various degrees of detail across the years; being identified as Dalai Lama at the age of two and undergoing a decade of training for the position, becoming a leader at the age of 16 as Tibetans faced the looming crisis of a Chinese takeover.

Forced to sign the Seventeen-Point Agreement under duress and subsequently finding himself a prime target in China’s attempts to subvert the Tibetan self-identity, escaping to and finding refuge in India, the successive rounds of negotiations between Beijing and Tibetan-Government-in-Exile situated in Dharamshala, and the responses of the global community to this question. 

A familiar cast of characters from Post-Colonial Asian histories rub shoulders with generations of Tibetan clergy in these experiences; a line of Chinese leaders from Chairman Mao to President Xi, Indian facilitators from PM Nehru to PM Modi, the Dalai Lama and his allies ranging from his brother Gyalo Thondup (1928-2025) to several Buddhist leaders in India, China, and across the world, and his engagements with several international figures and organisations.

He notes that India has been a long-time friend of Tibet, a relationship based on a history of shared Buddhist culture as well as - in modern times - the fact that peaceful relations between the two states contributed to the security and stability of their mutual borders.

PM Nehru’s policy of facilitating the exile Tibetan community is thus one that influenced the actions of successive Indian governments.

The Dalai Lama also recognises Nehru’s support and efforts in mediating between the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the Chinese authorities to bring about a mutually beneficial solution. Interestingly, he doesn’t provide commentary on the Indo-China War of 1962, fought barely half a decade after his seeking asylum with New Delhi; historians allege that India’s sheltering of the Dalai Lama was one of the factors contributing to deteriorating tensions between the two belligerents.

His supporters’ attempts to collaborate with the CIA in arming Tibetan resistance to the Chinese occupation are also only afforded a single line in a narrative that largely focuses on the Buddhist ethic vis-a-vis the domination of over 90% of the Tibetan population by the Chinese  State, portrayed as an avaricious oppressor committed to extracting Tibet’s resources and silencing its unique culture. 

He attempts to highlight the fallacies in Chinese claims of bringing about a peaceful and prosperous society when Tibet has been stifled for over seven decades.

However, his criticism of Communist China is tempered by a brief admission that the majority of the Tibetan ruling elite may have been entrenched in a largely redundant social order and resisted the 13th Dalai Lama’s attempts to bring about reform.

In this regard, he admits that the position of the Dalai Lama must only continue as long as it serves to unite Tibetans across the World; it must become neither a rallying point for Chinese claims of dissent or sedition in Tibet, nor a pawn to further their oppression.

Above all things, he is committed to a path of non-violence - taking inspiration from M.K Gandhi - and facilitating open dialogue to secure Tibetan autonomy within the framework of the Chinese State. His commitment to peace - which won him the Nobel Prize in 1989 - led him to appeal to the people of China and Tibet to find a common thread in their Buddhist worship and recognise the shared history of cooperation that persisted between the two nations for centuries.

Several ruling dynasties of China attempted to build alliances with the Kingdom of Tibet, signed treaties maintaining the status quo and harmonious ties, and even extended military aid to secure the 7th Dalai Lama’s position in 1720. The Qing Dynasty, which were Tibetan Buddhists, were especially invested in this relationship until their dissolution in the 20th Century.

These ties, along with his cordial relations with several Chinese scholars and Buddhists across the world, motivate the 14th Dalai Lama’s belief that China and Tibet can establish a mutually beneficial future relationship.

As to ever reconciling the tenuous relations between the Tibetan people and the Chinese State, the Dalai Lama’s observation in Chapter 9: In the Aftermath of Tiananmen - that it is time for the two states to coexist in friendship and the onus is on China to facilitate this reconciliation - may be a critical insight.

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BY SIDDHARTHA

COVERING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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