Bangladesh-Pakistan Reset and India’s Strategic Challenges: How Post-Hasina Bangladesh Is Reshaping South Asian Security

Secession, the separation of a territory from an established state, is one of the most disruptive moments in international politics. If accompanied by conflict, the relations between the two sides are unsurprisingly complex and turbulent. The new country attempts to define itself in opposition to the state from which it broke away. While the parent state, as the original state is called, may harbour feelings of resentment and humiliation.

Illustration by The Geostrata

When combined with widespread atrocities or displacement, the legacy of secession can last for decades, creating enduring diplomatic rifts. And yet, as the saying goes, “one can always expect the unexpected in geopolitics,” such relationships can change when political, economic, or strategic realities shift. One of the most notable examples of this is the recent reset of ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Born from a brutal liberation war against Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh’s independence left enduring scars that continued to influence Dhaka–Islamabad relations for more than five decades. Pakistan’s initial refusal to recognise Bangladesh, coupled with its reluctance to apologise for wartime crimes, laid the groundwork for a historical trauma that remains deeply embedded in Bangladesh’s national consciousness. 

However, a central question continued to overshadow Dhaka–Islamabad ties: can two nations, bound by decades of mistrust, ever move beyond this fractured history towards genuine reconciliation? 

POST HASINA RAPPROCHMENT

This question found an answer when former PM Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power in August 2024. The political landscape between Bangladesh and Pakistan saw an immediate shift, ushering in a new era of cooperation, ranging from political contacts to trade, security and cultural diplomacy. Under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, the Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government, there have been numerous diplomatic exchanges between the two nations, including Yunus’ meetings with Pakistan’s PM Shehbaz Sharif at various multilateral forums. During Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Dhaka, a first in 13 years, Islamabad called it a “historic” and “significant milestone” in bilateral relations. 

Trade and cultural relations have emerged as key focus areas between the two nations following this political thaw. Both sides have resumed direct trade, including seaborne shipments that had been suspended since the 1971 war. Between August and December 2024, bilateral trade between the two nations surged by 27 per cent. Direct flights have resumed, and both countries have simplified visa procedures to facilitate people-to-people exchange. 

Surprisingly, in a short span of time, defence ties between Dhaka and Islamabad have boomed across a broad spectrum of military cooperation areas. Some core developments include reciprocal visits by senior military officials and participation of the Bangladesh Navy in Pakistan’s multilateral maritime exercise, Aman-25, after a gap of over a decade. 

Bangladesh has also reportedly expressed interest in purchasing Pakistan’s JF-17 jets, co-developed with China, and there are claims of a potential purchase of Abdali missiles from Pakistan. With a range of about 400 km, these missiles could reach parts of northeastern India. These procurements, while unconfirmed, indicate a broader strategic realignment between the two countries’ militaries. Once ‘foes’ during the Liberation War, Pakistan’s military now describes them as “brotherly countries”. 

INDIA'S SECURITY DILEMMA

The past decade marked one of the most significant periods in India-Bangladesh relations,  often described as a ‘Golden Chapter’ of bilateral cooperation. Under Hasina's leadership, the New Delhi-Dhaka ties reached unprecedented levels, encompassing trade, security coordination, border resolution and water-sharing agreements. The thriving ties with Bangladesh contributed remarkably to the success of India's ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’ policies.

However, the fall of Hasina’s government and the resurgence of extremist factions in Bangladesh, such as the return of the once-banned Jamaat-e-Islami to the political landscape, pose renewed concerns for India. As Bangladesh resets its policy orientation, India now confronts a growing challenge: a friend turning uncertain, sometimes even hostile, while Pakistan is gaining ground. A hostile or neutral Bangladesh creates four immediate problems for India. 

A REVIVAL OF NORTHEASTERN INSURGENCIES First, it could facilitate the rekindling of dormant insurgencies in India’s Northeast. Bangladesh, either on its own or through collusion with Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), could again provide a permissive environment for insurgents by facilitating illegal cross-border movement of militants, arms, and narcotics.

The possibility of psychological operations aimed at destabilising sensitive frontier states, such as Assam, Manipur, and Tripura, also emerges. Besides, intelligence assessments have warned of renewed attempts by ISI to carry out mass infiltrations of illegal immigrants into West Bengal and the northeastern states, aimed at enforcing demographic changes and fueling insurgencies.

These threats have historical precedents, as Pakistan has actively supported separatist outfits from India’s Northeast since the late 1950s. Moreover, following the 1971 war, ISI and Jamaat-e-Islami waged a demographic war on India. Thus, the aim of Pakistan is simple: divert the Indian military’s resources away from Kashmir by keeping the northeast as a hotbed of insurgency. 

This revival of insurgencies would mark a sharp departure from the Hasina government's uncompromising 'zero tolerance' stance against Northeastern insurgent groups operating from Bangladesh, which particularly helped Delhi. However, the prevailing lack of ‘mutual sensitivity’ in India-Bangladesh ties risks reversing those gains. 

STRATEGIC RISKS ALONG THE SILIGURI CORRIDOR

Second, it heightens the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor more than ever. Earlier this year, Yunus, while visiting China, called India’s northeastern states “landlocked” and portrayed his country as the region’s “only guardian” of the Indian Ocean. More recently, during a meeting with a high-level Pakistani delegation, he gifted a book depicting parts of northeast India as part of Bangladesh. 

Once may be an aberration, but twice suggests a pattern. By projecting Dhaka’s leverage on access to Northeast India, this time, to Beijing and Islamabad, Yunus has added a new layer of strategic complexity to an already sensitive corridor.

Also, there are reports of Bangladesh’s plans to revive the Lalmonirhat airbase, located barely 20 km from the Indian border near Chicken’s Neck, with Chinese and Pakistani help. Just this threat of disruption along this narrow 22-km corridor is sufficient to force Delhi to maintain disproportionate reserves here.

RADICALISATION AND A COVERT TERROR LAUNCHPAD

The third concern arises from Bangladesh witnessing a surge in Islamic radicalisation, aided by Pakistan-linked extremist factions. Following the political transition, several jihadist networks have emerged under the aegis of Jamaat-e-Islami, which has coincided with the rise in anti-India rhetoric and attacks on religious minorities. 

Historically, under BNP-Jamaat governments, Bangladesh served as a permissive environment for ISI-backed groups. Terror outfits like Harkat-ul-Jihad (HUJI-B) built an extensive network across madrasas, using them as breeding grounds for indoctrination and recruitment for various terror activities.

Under Hasina, Bangladesh cracked down on ISI networks and dismantled many militant camps. However, following Hasina's exit, Bangladesh under Yunus has adopted a friendlier posture and has even allowed the proliferation of such activities with impunity.  

For the first time in more than fifteen years, the “long shadow” of ISI is once again falling across Bangladesh’s political and security landscape. The reported ISI Special Cell operating from within the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka, along with the visits of ISI officials, pose grave security risks for India, as Bangladesh could be used as a “hidden launchpad” for ISI-directed cross-border terror operations. 

This threat got reinforced when Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) commander Saifullah Saif revealed plans of opening a new front against India using Bangladesh. He claimed that Hafiz Saeed, the founder of LeT, was “preparing to attack India through Bangladesh,” and that LeT operatives were already active in “East Pakistan (Bangladesh)”. Given the porosity of the 4,000 km Indo-Bangladesh border, any resurgence of terror networks leveraging transit and operational support structures inside Bangladesh would put renewed pressure on India’s counter-terrorism and border-management capacities.

MARITIME SECURITY RISKS

The fourth concern stems from enhanced maritime cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh. In a first after the liberation war, Pakistan’s Navy ship visited Bangladesh, signalling Pakistan’s intention to re-establish its presence in the Bay of Bengal. Alongside this, the resumption of cargo ships entering and docking at the Bangladeshi port without inspection raises the risk of sea lanes being used for illicit activities.

Considering Bangladesh’s geographic vulnerability to arms and narcotics smuggling via maritime routes, any collusion with Pakistan’s ISI could significantly expand the narco-terrorism nexus, which would have adverse internal security consequences for India.

Along with this new perilous external dimension to India’s security, an equally worrying aspect is that since the Yunus regime took charge of Bangladesh, a concerted effort has been made at an agenda-driven re-imagination of Bangladesh’s liberation history. Wiping out this legacy for future generations also erases memories of India's contribution to the creation of Bangladesh, a fundamental pillar of the India-Bangladesh bilateral relationship.

THE CHINA FACTOR

Closer Dhaka-Islamabad relations and their security implications cannot be fully understood without factoring in China’s role. Each of the threats discussed above is compounded by Beijing's growing influence, together creating a continuous arc of strategic tension along India’s western, northern and eastern borders. 

Bangladesh’s China policy under Yunus no longer appears to be defined by his predecessor’s cautious balancing act. Hasina pursued a nuanced foreign policy of hedging: maintaining close security and political ties with Delhi while leveraging Beijing for economic growth. Under Yunus’s “friendship to all” vision, Dhaka’s policy towards Beijing appears closer to strategic alignment. 

China today remains Bangladesh’s largest supplier of military hardware, its largest trading partner and a major investor, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Meanwhile, Pakistan, with its “all-weather partnership” with China, coupled with emerging rapprochement with Bangladesh, risks serving as a bridge for expanding Beijing’s strategic reach over Dhaka’s economic and military decisions. 

This emerging triangular relationship aggravates India’s concerns of strategic encirclement. A potential China-Bangladesh-Pakistan convergence could challenge the regional status quo, placing India in a complex strategic dilemma. To illustrate, the Bangladesh Navy’s participation in Pakistan’s maritime exercise Aman-25, alongside the PLA Navy, risks potential interoperability between the three maritime forces, which could challenge India’s regional maritime dominance. 

Beyond military cooperation, in June 2025, Pakistan-Bangladesh-China held their first-ever trilateral meeting in Kunming, where the three sides agreed to explore enhanced cooperation in trade, investment, and connectivity, raising strategic concerns about dual-use infrastructure projects in India’s immediate neighbourhood. Highlighting such risks, India’s Chief of Defence Staff warned of serious consequences for India’s security if trilateral ties between Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China strengthen further.

As a result, India’s current challenge is not just that it faces a two-front threat to its security. For the first time in recent history, India finds itself confronting a complex security environment on three distinct fronts, with each country, Pakistan, China and Bangladesh, positing a unique security threat requiring different security responses.

THE ROAD AHEAD

A recent report by India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs described developments in Bangladesh as India’s “greatest strategic challenge” since the 1971 Liberation War. It acknowledged that Bangladesh is witnessing a “shift” and that New Delhi could end up losing the “strategic space” in Dhaka without necessary recalibration.

In response, India has broadened its outreach beyond the Awami League by engaging with political actors such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and civil society organisations to hedge against future political shifts in Dhaka. However, much depends on how the political situation develops after the upcoming elections.  

Although Hasina’s departure has drawn the curtains on the ‘Golden Chapter’, the reality remains unchanged: two neighbours bound by historical, cultural, geographical, and economic ties and a common future. Even as Bangladesh strengthens its relations with Pakistan, it cannot be a replacement for engagement with India. However, recognising this reality is Dhaka’s choice. As India’s Minister for External Affairs S. Jaishankar stated, “Bangladesh must decide what kind of ties it wants with India.”

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BY GARIMA ARORA

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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