The Treaty China Will Never Sign: Where Geography Meets Geopolitics

Geography is destiny. Nowhere is that true more than in the Brahmaputra basin, where China's position as an upper riparian state transformed this shared river into an instrument of silent coercion.

Illustration by The Geostrata

The Yarlung Tsangpo as it is called in Tibet before it flows down into Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang and spreads into Assam as the mighty Brahmaputra is not just a watercourse but a lifeline for many as it sustains agriculture, drinking water and ecology of the region while shaping the cultural identity of millions in India's north eastern states and that lifeline is entirely at the mercy of decisions made in Beijing.

This is not just a hypothetical fear; it’s a structural vulnerability that demands a formal, legally binding water-sharing treaty between India and China on the Brahmaputra river. The question is why one does not exist yet; it's who bears the responsibility for this absence.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF DISADVANTAGE

The Brahmaputra basin spans roughly 580,000 square kilometres across China, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh with India alone holding 33.6% of the basin waters. But as the river originates in the Tibet region, it gives China an undue upstream advantage which carries significant strategic weight.

Unlike the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, India is not having any binding agreement with China over the Brahmaputra though few data-sharing MoU’s are existing but China's upstream status enables it to act unilaterally. This is not a minor gap but a major one in India's water security architecture, one that Beijing has shown no hesitation in exploiting to its advantage whenever bilateral tensions arise.

The Siang river tells a story China never officially admitted. Flash floods triggered by upstream dam breaches on the Chinese side arrived without warning, at least three times impacting India. In 2017, the river turned alarmingly black as it entered Arunachal Pradesh, due to construction activity in Tibet that Beijing chose not to disclose. India learned of it in a  way downstream nations always do, after people get affected.

In the same year, during the Doklam standoff, China suspended hydrological data sharing which forced India to be left with inadequate data regarding the downstream water flow facing floods in the monsoon season, at the moment strategic tensions peaked. These are not isolated accidents but are quiet demonstrations signalling where power actually resides.

THE MEDOG DAM: A WATER BOMB AT INDIA'S DOORSTEP

The strategic calculus shifted dramatically when China approved and commenced construction of what will be the world's largest hydropower project called Medog Dam. Located on the eastern rim of the Tibetan plateau, the Yarlung Tsangpo is now set to become the site of the world's largest hydro power facility, tripling the capacity of China's famous Three Gorges Dam. The project is located in Medog County, just 30 km from the Indian border, which increases the chances of hydro hegemony with potential implications for downstream flow regulation with increased flood vulnerability.

According to initial studies done by NHPC and Arunachal Pradesh State government, water flow to India can be reduced by up to 80 per cent due to this project. Authorities have also hinted at the possibilities of China using it as a 'water bomb' or to induce floods in Indian territory.  Arunachal Pradesh's Chief Minister has warned that China could either divert the entire river flow, drying up the Siang or release water all at once causing unprecedented flood havoc downstream.

This is not alarmism. It is arithmetic. A reservoir of this much scale, sitting 30 kilometres from the Indian territory with no treaty governing its operation represents a structural threat to the north eastern states not in some distant future but with every passing monsoon season.

INDIA'S RESPONSE IS REACTIVE BUT NOT SUFFICIENT 

India's response is not passive as by recognising this threat, it accelerated the Upper Siang Multipurpose Project in Arunachal Pradesh that is conceptualised  to counter China's 60,000 MW Medog hydropower project on the river with buffer storage capacity of 9 billion cubic metres to ensure water availability during lean seasons and also to help in absorbing excess floodwater released by China. India's Ministry of External Affairs shared its concerns with Beijing on December 30, 2024 about the Medog dam's downstream impact but China chose to stay silent on it.,

India is investing in hydrological monitoring infrastructure, satellite surveillance, remote sensing and real-time monitoring systems along the Brahmaputra basin. These are the right steps but only reactive countermeasures than coming up with structural solutions. A buffer dam in Arunachal may moderate the impact of sudden waters releasing from the upstream but can't regulate the decision to release it in the first place. Only a treaty can ensure such a thing.

WHY CHINA WON'T SIGN

Beijing often reaffirms its desire for stable and peaceful ties with New Delhi with talks of confidence building measures as seen in keeping the diplomatic channel open always, yet on the question of a binding Brahmaputra water sharing agreement, it's maintaining a Strategic Silence. The reasons are both strategic and structural. 

China is one of the three countries, along with Turkey and Burundi, which voted against the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non - Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Reflecting on that, China signed no legally binding water sharing agreements with any of its downstream neighbours in regard to the Brahmaputra, Mekong and Salween rivers.

This upstream status is Beijing's most valuable asymmetric advantage across South and Southeast Asia to leverage for its geopolitical influence in the region. A formal treaty can convert that leverage into legal obligation, which China is not interested in.

Beijing views any treaty over the Brahmaputra as carrying implicit recognition of India's rights in Arunachal Pradesh, a territory it claims as South Tibet, Signing such agreement means accepting the river's downstream geography as legitimate Indian territory. The data sharing MoU’s between the two expired in June 2023 and a formal bilateral treaty remains still absent. The MoU itself was suspended during the Doklam standoff demonstrating that even the minimal existing mechanisms are prone to political weather.

THE NEED FOR BRAHMAPUTRA CONVENTION

The absence of a treaty is not just India's vulnerability, it’s a regional crisis in the making. Bangladesh, at the river's end, has voiced its worries about the Medog dam. In February 2026, Dhaka officially sought information regarding the dam's specifics but according to reports, Beijing didn't provide a formal reply.

Establishing a trilateral framework involving China, India, and Bangladesh, one that accurately mirrors the river's geography, is essential for fostering a diplomatic agreement on accountability.

It’s time now for India to pursue the Brahmaputra Convention that could transform this looming crisis into a foundation for regional stability turning rivers into shared resources rather than the contested fault lines.

The Indus Waters Treaty, though imperfect as it is, still survived six decades despite three wars as it created institutional structures that outlasted political crises. The Brahmaputra needs the same thing now. India must pursue this not from a position of supplication but from one of strategic clarity. The Brahmaputra is not just a river, its northeastern India's agricultural engine, ecological and cultural soul. The people of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, and beyond have the right to a future that does not depend on the mood in Zhongnanhai.

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BY PUNEETH

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