The Afterlife of “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai”: India-China Relations Between Competition and Cooperation

The two largest civilisational states and the emerging powers of the global order, New Delhi and Beijing, are often perceived as strategic competitors in an evolving geopolitical landscape. This conventional narrative overlooks a much more complex strategic reality. There exists geopolitical rivalry along with deep economic interdependence and partial cooperation in global governance.

Amid an increasingly multipolar international system, shifting supply chains, and intensifying great-power competition, the two nations navigate a delicate balance between competition and cooperation. It is important to understand this dynamic to determine the future of Asian geopolitics.

HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND THE TRUST DEFICIT 

India was one of the earliest non-communist nations to recognise the People's Republic of China. The two nations established their diplomatic relations in 1950. Pre-existing relations between leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai tried to promote the notion of Asian unity, epitomised in the slogan of “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai.” 

Nevertheless, this notion failed after the Sino-Indian War (1962), which fundamentally changed the trajectory of their relationship. It replaced trust with suspicion, creating a trust deficit. The unresolved boundary question along the Line of Actual Control remains the central fault line in bilateral relations even today. The border extends about 3,488 kilometres along the Himalayan frontier. There’s no mutually agreed boundary along this frontier and therefore, the region still experiences periodic confrontations between the two militaries.

The most severe episode in recent decades was the Galwan Valley clash (2020). It hardened Indian public opinion and triggered a strategic policy shift, including stricter investment regulations and the curtailment of Chinese digital platforms.

The two nations have tried to stabilise their borders by using negotiations and military disengagement processes. The 2024 border patrol understanding was a major development as it intended to re-establish pre-2020 policies concerning patrolling and tensions in the contentious areas of Demchok and Despang plains. Regardless of these confidence-building efforts, the Sino-Indian border dispute continues to exist. 

STRUCTURAL RIVALRY OF ASIAN GEOPOLOITICS

The India-China dynamic is embedded within a broader geopolitical contest for influence and dominance across the Asian region. China's economic power and an increase in military capabilities have changed the balance of power in the region to a great extent.

The strategic connectivity plan of Beijing, the Belt and Road Initiative, is focused on developing infrastructure corridors between Asia, Europe, and Africa. Though most nations perceive the initiative as a chance to boost their economies, India has associated concerns regarding any projects transiting through the contentious regions with the overall strategic interest of the increased presence of China in the region and its debt trap diplomacy. China, being the creditor nation, extends loans to the borrowing nations, expanding its political leverage, which makes BRI not just a developmental initiative, but a geoeconomic trap.

Other such Chinese military and commercial projects on land and at sea form a part of the String of Pearls. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centres in Somalia and the littoral South Asian countries of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. Such a system threatens India’s power projection, trade, and territorial integrity.

India's counter to this is its Necklace of Diamonds strategy which is not officially promulgated, but a phrase which encapsulates its efforts to expand military network and influence in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions through ports like Chabahar Port (Iran), Duqm Port (Oman), and Sabang Port (Indonesia).

Meanwhile, India has enhanced its strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, especially through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States, Japan and Australia, wherein maritime security, technological cooperation and the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific are prioritised.

These processes manifest what the experts of international relations have termed a classic security dilemma. Any control by one state that aims at improving its security is viewed by the other as offensive, leading to counter-balancing measures. In this regard, India-China rivalry is not only a bilateral conflict but an overall shift of the Asian region to the centre of the global politics of power.

THE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE DECOUPLING LIMITS

India and China have a broad economic relationship despite the existing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. The bilateral trade has increased over the last decade. By 2024-2025, India's trade deficit with China was approximately $99 billion, demonstrating the extent of economic interdependence between the two economies. The Chinese firms have been very instrumental in supplying the Indian industries with intermediate goods, especially in electronics, solar equipment, pharmaceuticals and telecommunication sectors. 

After the 2020 border dispute, India restricted Chinese investment; however, recent policy trends indicate a gradual rebalancing in China’s favour.

As a case in point, the government has recently relaxed some foreign investment regulations, allowing global investors to use the automatic route to make investments provided the stake is non-controlling and they own no more than 10% of the Chinese shareholdings.

This policy change will expedite foreign investment clearance in sectors such as electronics, batteries, and capital goods, reflecting the government's endeavour to empower domestic production and to involve India more fully in the global supply chain.

The government has also permitted partial imports on Chinese equipment in infrastructure developments like power generation and mining of coal to omit shortages of supply that had arisen due to the previous restrictions. These judgments highlight the limits of total economic decoupling between two very closely linked economies.

INCREMENTAL EFFORTS TO REBUILD TRUST AND ENGAGEMENT

Over the last few years, the two nations have increased diplomatic engagement. An important milestone was achieved in 2024 when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan. This was the first engagement between the two leaders in several years. The diplomatic engagement was further extended to 2025 and 2026 with several incremental steps to rebuild confidence. The most obvious being the resumption of direct passenger flights between India and China in October 2025, after a five year break.

In addition, the recovery of routes such as Kolkata-Guangzhou has resulted in business, tourism, and freight services being exchanged between the two nations. Visa restrictions imposed on Chinese professionals in the electronics manufacturing sector and technological services have also been relaxed, addressing the shortage of technical experts in the sector that had been affecting the speed of industrial production.

Both sides have also spoken of opening the border trade routes through the Nathu La Pass and Shipki La Pass along with the revival of tourism and pilgrimage routes such as the Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar Yatra. These measures, although modest, are confidence-building measures that have helped in the development of the relationships that were shattered after the clash in the Galwan Valley.

GLOBAL SOUTH AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

The other aspect that is mostly left out in the debate on India-China rivalry is the level of cooperation between the two nations in multilateral institutions. India and China play key roles in platforms such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the G20. These organizations offer forums through which they collaborate on matters like financial governance, development financing and climate change negotiation.

India's 2026 BRICS chairmanship indicates that multilateral interaction between the two Asian giants remains significant.

In these forums, India and China usually take common grounds on global governance reforms, especially the necessity to accord more representation to emerging economies at the international institutions. This convergence indicates a broader alignment of the Global South in seeking a closer and equitable international order.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, India-China relations cannot be reduced to oversimplified dichotomies of friendship or rivalry. What exists today between India and China is competition along with selective cooperation. The growing spheres of interaction indicate that the relationship is more nuanced than it is often seen.

The slogan “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” may no longer define the facts of contemporary realities, but neither does the narrative of an inevitable confrontation. In an increasingly uncertain world order, a gradual thaw driven by pragmatic interests would be mutually advantageous, as both Asian giants could stabilise their neighbourhoods while advancingtheir wider strategic interests.

---

BY VEDIKA KAUSHIK DWIVEDI

TEAM GEOSTRATA

info@thegeostrata.com