China’s Northeast Strategy: Beyond Borders, Towards Influence, Tracing China’s Expanding Interest in India’s Northeast

FROM THE MCMOHAN LINE TO MODERN CLAIMS: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE DISPUTE

India's neighbourhood is marked by complex geopolitical realities, with both Pakistan and China posing distinct challenges to its security, diplomacy, and regional interests. The India-Pakistan relations are clearly adversarial in nature. In addition to cross-border terrorism, Pakistan uses a number of other asymmetric methods, such as narcoterrorism, disinformation campaigns, diplomatic hindrances, and proxies that can create problems within the country, especially in Kashmir.

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At the same time, India-China relations are complicated by many aspects. Even though both countries are economically linked, with China among the biggest trade partners of India, they still have a problem in their bilateral relationship and a lengthy dispute over the border issue that is nearly seven decades old. Tensions continue to exist between India and China at the northern frontiers, including, for example, Aksai Chin in Ladakh and the northeastern frontiers in places like Arunachal Pradesh and the Siliguri Corridor.

ARUNACHAL PRADESH AND CHINA'S TERRITORIAL NARRATIVE

Apart from the ongoing dispute over the boundary, including the status of Arunachal Pradesh, China’s interest is linked to efforts aimed at altering the security environment in India’s neighbourhood. This involves raising territorial questions and making periodic claims to exert pressure on the region. China has adopted a number of terminological and cartographic measures to promote the idea of territorial integrity. In the eastern sector of the India-China boundary, the dispute is not merely territorial but deeply rooted in history, legality, and competing narratives.

China still refuses to recognize the existing border, insisting that vast territories of Arunachal Pradesh belong to so-called "South Tibet" or Zangnan. 

This position is not a recent development; it emerged because of disputes that existed since the beginning of the 20th century. 

The roots of the dispute can be traced to the Shimla Convention when representatives of British India, Tibet, and China tried to fix their borders officially. It was decided to divide Tibet into two parts, Inner and Outer, resulting in defining the border that became known as the McMahon Line, separating India from Tibet. British India and Tibet agreed to it, while China rejected it, maintaining that Tibet did not have the right to sign such treaties on its own behalf. 

India views the McMahon Line as its rightful eastern border, while China rejects it as colonial interference. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that such disagreement cannot be explained in terms of historical signatures only. This is because China's approach to the issue can be considered selective. On the one hand, China refuses to consider the colonial treaties valid. On the other hand, it makes references to the history of Tibetan influence.

It has relevance because of the cartographical and diplomatic moves made by China in order to strengthen its claim over Arunachal Pradesh. As for India, it regards the region as crucial for both territorial integrity and military strategy in the Northeast. Therefore, it becomes clear that the tensions related to the eastern section of the Line of Actual Control have nothing to do with colonial uncertainty only. They result from continuous strategic considerations and attempts to build a certain narrative around the issue. 

The Sino-Indian war has been another crucial point which decided the direction of the India-China relationship. It took place not only in Ladakh but in the eastern sector of the border dispute, namely Arunachal Pradesh. From then onwards, all the Chinese activities related to the Northeast were always linked with their claims over Arunachal Pradesh, which, according to them, still forms an integral part of Chinese territory. These claims have been supported by some measures, such as renaming places, stapled visas, and challenging Indian documents issued to people from Arunachal Pradesh whenever possible.

The efforts of the Chinese to strengthen their territorial claim are also demonstrated by renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh using Mandarin names. Moreover, the territory of Arunachal Pradesh is shown on Chinese maps as being a part of China’s territory. However, the above efforts cannot change anything on the ground, but they are part of China’s larger strategy. The boundary between India and China can be analysed into three sectors: the western, the central, and the eastern, based on the differences in their strategic concerns rather than the geographic distinctions.

Firstly, the western sector, which encompasses the territory of Ladakh, stands out as the most volatile one. This sector involves the dispute over territories like Aksai Chin and sporadic military confrontations. The importance of the sector to India is attributed to the issue of territorial integrity and security along its borders. The central sector, which comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, has remained peaceful without any dispute between the two countries. This sector has a clearly defined boundary line but the sector remains strategically important because of its proximity to the Tibetan plateau. Lastly, the eastern sector, which includes the state of Arunachal Pradesh, is diplomatically sensitive. Due to the territorial claim of China over this area on cultural grounds, the sector remains a source of dispute.

TAWANG AND THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF INDIA'S NORTHEAST

In addition to the geopolitical aspect, there is also a cultural element associated with the claims of China. For instance, Arunachal Pradesh is inhabited by indigenous groups like Tagins, Nyishis and Galos who practice a culture similar to Tibetan culture. Moreover, the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, in Tawang is considered an example of the connection between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet. Besides, there are also monastic links between Tawang and Lhasa.

The strategic importance of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh is immense and highly relevant in the changing relations between India and China. Contrary to the perception that the region lies on the periphery of the conflict, it holds great strategic significance in the eastern theatre and has been under pressure from China's persistent efforts to claim the territory by way of regular incursions.

An important aspect adding to the significance of Tawang is the presence of the Bum La Pass, a vital strategic route that has been used traditionally for military mobility and confrontations. As the region lies close to the Line of Actual Control, even minor military activities in the region can have far-reaching strategic consequences. Influence over such strategically vital routes ensures quick mobilisation of troops in case of an emergency.

The importance of Tawang lies not only in terms of border-related issues but also as an important factor impacting the wider strategic landscape. If one considers other regions like the Doklam plateau in proximity to the India-Bhutan-China trijunction, then Tawang lies within a larger strategic region affecting the Siliguri Corridor region, which is a very narrow strip of land and has been termed the "chicken's neck" of India.

BEYOND THE BORDER: CHINA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE AND INDIA'S STRATEGIC CHALLENGE

China’s activities along the eastern frontier of India are now seen more in terms of a multi-dimensional approach than any single act. With its increasing involvement with neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, there emerges a clear indication of a strategy to transform the strategic environment around India’s Northeast region.

With the help of projects involving connectivity as well as river-based projects, China is getting embedded into the economic and geographical environment of the region. The developments taking place in the Teesta basin area in Bangladesh assume significance not only because of their economic significance but also due to the fact that they are projects located strategically close to the Siliguri corridor.

In addition to this, China’s activities on the upper reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) river add another element of leverage in favour of China. Possession of control over the water resources of a transboundary river system may have far-reaching strategic implications for the downstream regions, such as Assam. In the same way, infrastructure development in sensitive areas such as the Doklam plateau through road development has strategic implications for the future.

CONCLUSION

Overall, China's approach towards India should not be understood through one goal alone. Instead, it is a complex set of actions involving territorial claims, infrastructure reach, resource power, and peripheral influence-building.

In other words, the struggle is not merely about the question of border demarcation but also the shaping of its surrounding conditions.

India's reaction to China's activities needs to go beyond military preparations at the Line of Actual Control. It also requires efforts to increase regional connectivity, build up relationships with neighbouring nations, develop local regions and address the vulnerabilities within the Northeast. Security in the Northeast cannot be considered just a defensive requirement but also a strategic priority. In that sense, the frontier is not just a line of control; it is a test of resilience, state capacity, and long-term strategic vision.

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BY BIBHA

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