Bangladesh at the Crossroads: Indian Perspective on Stability, Strategy, and the Neighbourhood

For India, Bangladesh has never been just another neighbor. Geography would have made that impossible, but history sealed it. The two countries share memories of 1971, which still shape political instincts on both sides, and there are dense economic and social ties; this means that developments in Bangladesh are seldom distant events for New Delhi.

Illustration by The Geostrata

They are experienced, discussed, and in many cases privately fretted about.

For most of the last decade, India was accustomed to thinking of Bangladesh as one of the most stable entities in South Asia. While the rest of the region faced coups, economic collapse, or diplomatic breakdowns, Dhaka seemed stable. 

However, that comfort has started to unravel with political instability, street violence, and pre-election uncertainty that have brought Bangladesh back into India’s strategic focus. India’s problem is not essentially ideological. It is based on stability. A stable and governable Bangladesh makes India’s eastern front easier to manage, and when it isn’t, the effects are rapidly transnational.

FOUNDATIONS AND POLITICAL TRUST The shadow of 1971 still looms over the India-Bangladesh relationship. India’s backing during the Liberation War established a political and emotional base that few bilateral relationships can boast of, but the ensuing decades were mixed with military coups, fragile civilian governments, and border river disputes, which never allowed the relationship to become stable. 

This began to change post 2009 when Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League returned to power. It was a clear transition for India as Dhaka took a firm stance against anti-India insurgent groups operating from within Bangladeshi territory, especially in the North East.

This resulted in camps being broken up and leaders being delivered. The practice of intelligence cooperation was no longer an exception. Thus, the collaboration altered India’s calculations of its own internal security. It gave New Delhi a reason to think more grandly about economic integration and connectivity as fragile political trust became functional. 

FRAYING LAW AND ORDER PICTURE

Security cooperation has been the linchpin of India–Bangladesh relations, and recent developments have become cause for concern. In Bangladesh, student protests in 2024 led to the release of criminals and banned Islamist organisations, such as Jamaat e Islami and its affiliates, have resurfaced in the public sphere with a sense of entitlement. This is something Indian security officials are paying close attention to. Footage of armed men walking around freely, or police looking the other way while violence occurs, poses uncomfortable questions of what happens when politics gets aggressive, and the law is not enforced.

This is not an abstract issue for India. The implications of a lack of proper law and order in Bangladesh are not only for border management, but also for counter-terrorism cooperation and the tenuous stability of India’s northeast.

New Delhi’s response has not been harsh and confrontational but subtly executed, with India cutting down on issuing visas to Bangladeshi citizens. The biggest sufferers have been common people, particularly those looking to avail of medical facilities or for short-term trade in Indian cities. Indian authorities are cognisant of the human toll. But this is a security assessment, not a diplomatic signal, and from this perspective, stability has to be the first step.

ECONOMIC TIES AND THE CONNECTIVITY QUESTION

Economically, Bangladesh continues to be one of India’s key regional partners. It is the largest trading partner of India in South Asia, and the bilateral trade is over 15 billion dollars. India’s surplus is still a source of tension, but measures like duty-free access and targeted investment have helped to alleviate the imbalance.

The most important aspect of the India-Bangladesh relationship continues to be connectivity. For India’s northeastern states, Bangladesh is the closest access to ports, markets, and supply chains. It is not only trade that revives old rail links, inland waterways, and road corridors, it’s about integration.

Projects such as power grid interconnections, port access agreements - notably the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWTT) since 1972, and a 2018 agreement granting India access to Bangladesh's Chattogram (Chittagong) and Mongla ports for trade, and the India Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline - 2023 are evidence of a more fundamental trend towards structural cooperation. 

However, there has been an inconsistency in its application,khale as there is a price to pay for delay. While India is moving slowly, others, including the Chinese counterparts, are moving at a faster pace, building bilateral connectivity networks and agreements.

DHAKA'S INTERNAL POLICY CHOICES

Internally, water sharing remains a political patience testing issue on both sides as Teesta and the Ganga are lifelines, but agreements are still pending. The most common argument is the one related to federal constraints, in particular, the role of the states in India. On the other hand, Bangladeshi leaders are skeptical and lack a sense of urgency.

Thus, both interpretations have an element of truth, which only complicates the matter. With climate pressures exacerbating the situation, Bangladesh is already suffering from river erosion, flooding, and sea level rise, and India is silently suffering with unmanaged displacement and the pressure on already sensitive border areas, making collaborative river management and climate adaptation no longer optional.

LEADERSHIP CHANGE, BNP'S RETURN, AND INDIA'S ELECTION CALCULUS

The political situation in Bangladesh has taken a dramatic turn with the alleged death of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in December 2025. Her death has raised questions about leadership, legitimacy, and succession within the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Simultaneously, the return of BNP leader Tarique Rahman to active politics and rumors of his possible role in a post-election government have also caught the eye in New Delhi, as the previous BNP governments had also been marked by strained relations, decreased security cooperatio,n and an increase in anti-India activities. 

Importantly, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent meeting with Tarique Rahman on 31st December, 2025 has been interpreted as a sign of India’s pragmatism. New Delhi is bracing for a political transformation that it does not support, as alignment is not the goal, but rather engagement is. India’s official stance is that of non-interference.

Yet, in private, it places process above personality, one with a legitimate election,  institutions that functio,n and a state that can maintain law and order. Moreover, the growing role of China further complicates this calculation. China is still Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and a major financier of infrastructure. India does not have a principled objection to Bangladesh’s relationship with China, but the issue is more about strategic assets and long-term dependencies, especially in the Bay of Bengal.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is at a politically heavy moment. Its institutions will be tested by upcoming elections, leadership changes, and internal security threats. For India, the stakes are obvious, even if the results are not. A peaceful and stable Bangladesh is in India’s security, economic, and regional interests, making New Delhi’s response potentially one with caution, engagement, and a silent commitment to continuity rather than rhetoric. In South Asia, stability is never permanen,t and when it starts to wobble, the neighbors notic,e and India certainly has.

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BY CHIRAG JOSHI

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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