A Decade of Paris: India’s Climate Balancing Act
- THE GEOSTRATA
- 3 hours ago
- 6 min read
When the Paris Agreement was adopted in December 2015, it was seen as a rare moment of global alignment, as for the first time, 197 countries accepted a shared framework to respond to climate change while still keeping control over how that response would unfold nationally. It was significant for India because climate change had never been an abstract future risk, as it was already becoming evident in longer summers, erratic monsoons, dried-up farmlands, and increasing pressure on water and livelihoods.

Illustration by The Geostrata
At the Paris summit, India presented climate change not as a negotiating position but as a shared human concern. Prime Minister Narendra Modi termed it a question of humanity's collective destiny, and the words reflected India's perspective that climate action could not be separated from justice nor be simplified to mere national calculations. After ten years, this framing still influences India's evaluation of Paris, as the agreement established a global framework but did not eliminate inequality.
In India, climate policy is closely tied to ongoing economic development and the need to secure basic livelihoods. The initial Global Stocktake in 2023 substantiated the expectations of a number of developing countries over a long period of time. Almost all parties have participated in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, but the joint effort remains insufficient to achieve the temperature targets, and the issue is not a lack of promises but the disparity of results. India considers the Paris Agreement a driver of real change while also recognising limitations that cannot be addressed through domestic initiatives alone.
INDIA’S COMMITMENTS AND MEASURED PROGRESS
India shaped its climate commitments under the Paris Agreement largely based on its context. In 2015, the country submitted its first nationally determined contribution (NDC), where it promised to cut the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33-35% from 2005 levels by 2030. India also agreed to source about 40% of the total electricity capacity from non-fossil fuel sources by the same year, as well as generating an additional carbon sink equivalent to 2.5-3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide by increasing forest and tree cover. Such pledges were in line with India's strategic decision. The country prioritised energy efficiency and a gradual shift to clean energy over absolute emission reductions.
During the Paris negotiations, Indian delegates consistently conveyed that climate responsibility should consider developmental asymmetries by pointing out that rich lifestyles in developed countries must be curtailed in order for developing societies to have access to basic needs. Thus, they put development at the core of the mitigation pathway instead of treating emissions reduction as a separate goal. In 2022, India revised its NDC, making its emissions intensity reduction target more ambitious at 45% by 2030 and the non-fossil electricity capacity target to 50%. Together with this revision, India also forwarded its long-term, low-emission development strategy and net-zero emissions target.
Official records reveal that India has reduced its emissions intensity by around 36% from 2005 to 2020, and the country is broadly in line with its enhanced target. The share of electricity generation from non-fossil sources exceeded 47% at the end of 2024, and by the beginning of 2025, this share was very close to 50%. Nevertheless, it should be noted that installed capacity is not the same as electricity generation due to the intermittency of renewable sources and the use of coal for baseload supply.
The cost reductions in technologies have been the main factor behind the growth of renewable energy in India, besides policy support and the rapid deployment of solar and wind projects. Meanwhile, energy efficiency measures, such as the nationwide LED distribution and industrial efficiency schemes, have limited energy demand growth without affecting economic growth. In line with this development, India's Environment Minister declared in 2025 that the country had accomplished two out of the three quantitative targets set in its Paris commitments.
India's emissions in absolute terms have actually gone up over the last few years, in spite of the advances made. This is largely attributable to the sustained economic growth, urbanisation and increasing energy demand. However, this trajectory is still in line with the Paris framework, which does not require developing countries to reduce their absolute emissions, and also takes into account the fact that development pathways cannot be frozen while transitions are underway. Consequently, India's climate strategy under the Paris Agreement has been incremental and calibrated, aiming at bending the emissions curve without destabilising the economic or social structures.
STRUCTURAL GAPS IN THE PARIS FRAMEWORK
The Paris framework is a bottom-up system of ambition nationally determined, though in principle, supported by finance, technology transfer, and capacity building, but in practice, these enablers have persistently been at the far end of the need spectrum. In 2009, developed countries undertook the obligation to mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to support mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing economies, but this collective target was not met by the original deadline and was reported as having been reached for the first time only in 2022, i.e., five years after the commitment came due. In addition, the composition of climate finance has been raising concerns as there has been a considerable proportion of climate finance which has been reported as taking the form of loans rather than grants, thus leading to an increase in the debt burden of the recipient countries instead of providing the additional and concessional support.
The distribution of this has largely been targeted at mitigation measures and less than a quarter of the total reported climate finance between 2016 and 2022 was adaptation finance, although the assessed needs for the latter were much higher. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, adaptation needs in developing countries can cost several hundred billion dollars a year by 2030, and the needs in South Asia are generally estimated to be as high as tens of billions of dollars annually by the end of the decade. This gap has immediate human costs as India recorded thousands of heat related deaths during the extreme heatwaves of 2022 and the summers that followed.
The first Global Stocktake that ended in 2023 reaffirmed that global greenhouse gas emissions are still not in line with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement. The total emissions have continued to grow in the early 2020s. According to the Stocktake, the full execution of the NDCs would still lead to a temperature increase of more than 2 °C at the end of the century, unless the level of ambition and the amount of action are significantly increased. This evaluation brings back the concern that the Paris Agreement has produced a lot of paper ambition, but the actual delivery of commitments has been behind. The emissions reductions in a few advanced economies have gone at a slower pace than originally promised, and high emitters are still logging their per capita emissions at a level that is several times higher than those of developing countries like India.
BEYOND 2025: EQUITY AS THE MEASURE OF CREDIBILITY
As the Paris Agreement moves into its second decade, the main question is not only whether countries will take action but also whether the framework can provide fair outcomes on a large scale. By 2025, countries were expected to submit updated NDCs informed by the Global Stocktake, but most missed the original February deadline, and submissions have continued into late 2025 as the process prepares for COP30. The global reviews indicate that to follow a path consistent with a 1.5 °C increase in temperature, emissions should be reduced by about 45% by 2030 compared to 2010. The emissions reductions projected for 2030 would still be insufficient, and the gap would amount to several gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions per year. India's case is that stronger climate action has to be accompanied by a significant increase in support.
India's climate initiatives beyond its NDCs have mainly worked to set the agenda and provide the platform for coordination rather than to serve as mechanisms for delivery of the agenda. The International Solar Alliance is institutionally very much alive and has gradually progressed towards implementation programmes, even as the United States has pulled out, mirroring the varying preferences of the major economies and keeping the mobilisation of finance uneven. The Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure has strengthened its position in integrating climate change risks in infrastructure planning through the development of standards and technical cooperation, whereas the Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) has brought the issue of sustainable consumption to the forefront of the global discourse, yet it is largely normative.
India's efforts have expanded the climate agenda; however, India still holds on to its expectations and respect for the national circumstances should be the way forward. Equity should not be a rhetorical device; it should determine the rules, resources, and implementation processes. At the announcement of India's long-term climate goals at COP26 in Glasgow, Prime Minister Modi said, India is committed to doing more than its fair share to address climate change: a fair share must be based on real capacity and differentiated responsibility.
BY GUNJAN YADAV
TEAM GEOSTRATA
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