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The Emerging Islamic Defence Pacts: Are they any different from the old Islamic groupings, and should India be wary?

9 hours ago
6 min read

Escalating tensions in the Middle East have led regional countries to secure their own security by reducing their unconditional reliance on a single Western security provider that acts capriciously in protecting its allies. Thus, regional powers have begun laying the groundwork for their own regional security architecture; however, divergent interests and internal differences may prove detrimental to the operationalisation of these emerging pacts.


Illustration by The Geostrata


These neo-Islamic solidarity pacts are no less internally contradictory than the Islamic organisations of the last century, including groupings like the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The differences were evident during the Qatar blockade in 2017, and the ongoing US-Israel war against Iran has shed light on the tremendous divide between the Arab partners.


Along with Washington’s self-vested interest and its unconditional support for Israel against the hegemonic rivalry with Iran, adds further layers of uncertainty, exacerbating the risk. 

Thus, the piece evaluates these emerging regional security frameworks, their divergent interests, and their relevance in providing the shield that the Gulf countries are in dire need of.


THE EMERGING PACTS


So while the security architecture is shifting in the Gulf, the Gulf partners aren’t decoupling completely from their decades-old ally, the USA, but are adding their own developed security framework to ensure strategic autonomy and assured deterrence against imminent threats. 


The ongoing war has made them more aware of the fact that while America's military presence still holds ground in the Gulf, it doesn’t guarantee their protection.

The pioneer of this security architecture was the ‘Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement’ signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in September 2025, when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan officially formalised their nearly eight decades of military cooperation. 


In line with strengthening this framework, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a trilateral agreement with Turkiye on August 7, 2026, naming the pact Mecca after the holy city.

The Mecca Pact includes a collective security clause, under which an attack on one country is considered an attack on the other two signatories as well.


However, how effective are these collective security clauses in practice, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict involving Saudi Arabia and Yemen?

Nevertheless, Pakistan and Turkiye signed yet another quadrilateral defence cooperation framework in Doha on 21st October, named the Badr Pact. The Pact aims at deepening cooperation in defence manufacturing, joint research, technical training, and development of industrial capacity.


The Name Badr comes in reference to the ‘Battle of Badr’ fought by Prophet Muhammad in 624 CE, which is one of Islam’s earliest battles in the Arabian Peninsula. However, according to the joint statement, it noted Badr as a ‘full moon’ and the pact symbolising the coming together of four partners and complementing each other’s interests. So whether the Pact might be interpreted as a framework to fight against the respective enemies of each partner or whether it aims at a collective security architecture in West Asia, both ways it is a concerning fact for India. 


SHOULD INDIA BE WARY?


So, while the Mecca Pact talks about collective security and deterrence, whose ground implementation is doubted, the Badr Pact is said to strengthen Pakistan’s military capabilities and defence systems through diverse multilateral partnerships. Till now, Pakistan has been reliant on China for its defence capabilities, but with the Badr Pact, it will be able to diversify its weaponry and military technologies; such modernisation could make Pakistan’s domestic defence much more capable. 


The most significant member country that will strengthen Pakistan’s defence capabilities is Turkiye, which has well-established relations with Pakistan’s military through its years-long cooperation, particularly in its naval platforms. 

For example, the Babur-class corvettes built in Istanbul and further development of shipyard infrastructure in Pakistan reflect the depth and trust of the bilateral relationship.

In fact, it’s Türkiye’s production capacity and technological expertise that are the bedrock of these pacts. Another key area of concern for India should be the Indonesian factor. Recently, India announced its deal for BrahMos cruise missiles and Astra air-to-air missiles with Indonesia, but as a key partner in the Badr pact, it raises concerns about technology transfer on the Indian side.


However, DRDO chair and former director of BrahMos Aerospace, Sudhir Kumar Mishra, has confirmed that the deal with Indonesia has been done with safeguards and that only user manuals will be shared and not the technology transfer manuals. Nevertheless, it might encumber the India-Indonesia bilateral relationship, because Indonesia too has a deeply embedded partnership with Ankara; one such example is their joint production and development of the KAPLAN MT medium-weight tank project and many others.


So while at present the Mecca Pact has shown no levels of activation, the Badr Pact entails a concern for India, and thus it should closely monitor the technology transfers and the extent of the relation within the pact members, as indirect proliferation assistance and technology know-how could be a red flag for India’s national security. Building consensus on collective defence of a partner may not be that flexible, but building a joint consensus on defence co-development and co-production among partner countries is the need of the hour for the Gulf countries and thus brings more flexibility in institutionalization. 


Taken together, Pakistan’s existing defence engineering, Saudi Arabia’s custodianship of Islamic sites & financial weight, Qatari investment, Indonesia’s infrastructure, and Turkey’s robust defence industry can pave the way for a much greater and stronger defence industrial ecosystem. However, the question that arises further is: will the countries of the pacts be able to navigate the opportunities, or will they get constrained by their own internal contradictions? 


INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS: ARE THE NEW ISLAMIC PACTS ANY DIFFERENT FROM THE OLD ISLAMIC GROUPINGS?


The Islamic states have repeatedly differed on several occasions regarding their diverse security priorities, regional conflicts, and their relations with external powers; thus, differences in the newly established pacts will not be something off the table. 

Turkiye enters the grouping with its neo-Ottoman and populist movement-based Islamic ideologies, which have long been viewed as a threat to monarchical legitimacy, such as that of Saudi Arabia.


The rivalry was laid bare during the Qatar blockade 2017- 2021, when Ankara backed Doha against Riyadh. The coming together of two competing Islamic leaderships in a single compact pact risks being the reason for its weak operationalisation or irrelevance.

Similarly, in the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), it has a Saudi-dominant operationalisation, in which Saudi Arabia stands at the helm of the organisation, pushing aside smaller states like Qatar and their roles.


This reflects the competing and divergent interests of each member state, which have largely hindered the operationalisation of these groupings. A similar pattern can be observed in the case of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), where an overarching body of 57 member states has failed to build consensus within the groupings due to vast, divergent competing interests.


INNER CONTRADICTIONS IN NEW PACTS


The possibility of this geopolitical asymmetry also exists within the Mecca pact, where a NATO member state, a nuclear power, and wealthy Gulf leadership may have dissent and divergence related to command & control of the grouping and key decision-making. 


Apart from competing interests, independent foreign policies of individual states can impede collective action within the grouping, so while Iran can be a rival for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey both have intricate diplomatic relations with Tehran that risk strategic encirclement for Islamabad and Ankara.


Similarly, India has a different set of ties with each nation of the Mecca and Badr pacts. India has a substantive relationship with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf, Infact Riyadh has kept its stance neutral on Kashmir and India-Pakistan tensions. 


Thus, Pakistan expecting a military intervention from its Gulf partners, except Turkey, against India in a conflict will be a grave strategic miscalculation on Pakistan’s front.

Another major shortcoming that the group might face is the possible expansion of the Mecca Pact, because bringing countries together for defence production is a different thing from building consensus among member states for commitment to collective deterrence. As the clause brings obligations to the table, which might be a tough individualist choice for each member nation to fulfill. Therefore, countries like Bangladesh, Syria, and Egypt should carefully consider the commitments they might be stepping into.


Thus, Islamic solidarity won’t be sufficient alone to ensure durable security cooperation. For the principles of the grouping to get operationalised, it requires integrated and cohesive institutional depth, something that may not be obstructed by existing differences and decades-old rivalries. For now, Islamabad’s principal gain is the so-called ‘diplomatic role’ it is playing and the financial cushioning that it is getting from its Gulf partners, as it is accustomed to the IMF payouts.


CONCLUSION


For any bloc to get operationalised, institutionalisation is important, and at the very foundation, the pacts lack these provisions. With no command and control centre or strategic boards, the sky-high objectives of the pacts seem distant and far too aspirational. 

Even the further expansion of the blocs within the Gulf states is accompanied by internal rivalries, divergent strategic interests, and individual foreign policies. Thus, whether the blocs lead to any concrete actions or whether they will remain shelved will be determined once the war dust settles.


BY NEHA

TEAM GEOSTRATA


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