India’s China Balancing Act: Learning to Compete Without Colliding
For years, India–China relations seemed trapped between two uncomfortable realities. The border was tense, but trade kept growing. While political trust diminished, economic dependence proved far harder to untangle. Today, however, with diplomatic and economic avenues re-opening, it seems that a new chapter is beginning. Calling it a “reset” may be premature. Instead of what we see emerging now, it resembles more of managed rivalry – ensuring rivalry does not exceed certain limits, reviving some avenues of cooperation but being ready to face tensions again.

Illustration by The Geostrata
Minister for Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal expressed this wariness most aptly when he mentioned India’s efforts to build a relationship with China “once again”. But his demands were just as essential: the engagement would depend on a fair bargain, continuity, and a geopolitical climate that does not worsen. He also stressed that “the last word has not yet been scripted” on the relationship.
A THAW, BUT WITH GUARDRAILS
Diplomacy, obviously, is not what it was during the years following the 2020 Galwan confrontation. After the Modi-Xi summit held in October 2024, India and China have been able to revive processes that were stagnant or politically impossible.
Direct flights resumed in October 2025, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra returned, and border trade reopened. Diplomatic and military conversations have also become more regular.
The meeting between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in August 2026 was a step further. Both sides reached consensus regarding new points of meeting for senior military officials and new military hotlines in the Eastern Sector and the Middle Sector, besides agreeing on mechanisms to avoid miscalculations or misunderstandings along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). These developments matter, but they should not be mistaken for the disappearance of strategic distrust.
The location of New Delhi continues to link the broader relationship with stability on the border. The Minister for External Affairs, S. Jaishankar, restated in July that peace and tranquillity on the border is the precondition for a normal relationship. Therefore, the new setup does not relate to forgetting Galwan but rather to ensuring that another Galwan does not define the whole relationship.
ECONOMICS IS PULLING BOTH WAYS
The strongest argument against complete India–China decoupling sits in the trade numbers. Bilateral trade reached roughly $151.1 billion in FY2025–26. India imported about $131.6 billion worth of Chinese goods while exporting only $19.47 billion, leaving an enormous imbalance. China also accounted for around 17% of India's imports.
Such a reliance becomes especially significant considering the fact that many Chinese imports are not merely consumer goods. They include electronics, machinery, chemicals, pharmaceutical inputs and industrial components that feed India's own manufacturing economy. That creates a contradiction at the centre of India's China policy.
India wishes to mitigate its strategic vulnerabilities arising from heavy reliance on China, but abruptly breaking away from Chinese supply chains would harm India's own industry. The objective, therefore, increasingly appears to be de-risking rather than disengagement.
Goyal's emphasis on “continuity” is significant in this context. In regard to India, economic security not only means securing the least expensive input, but also whether that particular input will still be available in case of a geopolitical crisis. This is not a matter of whether India should conduct trade with China, but rather how much leverage the trade will bring to China.
FROM DEPENDENCE TO MANAGED EXPOSURE
It is for this reason that the opening up of economic space should not be considered at odds with India’s efforts to make itself more self-reliant in terms of manufacturing capacity and logistics. New Delhi can maintain its engagement with China even while seeking to minimise its vulnerabilities in semiconductors, critical minerals, electronics, drugs, and green technology industries.
In fact, the two policies reinforce each other. As India’s alternative supply chains get better, India will have much more space to interact with China without being excessively dependent on it. On the other hand, selectively engaging economically can benefit Indian industries until such other alternatives are available.
These recent developments point to such a new strategy. India has begun to lift its economic barriers with China with caution. In March 2026, it made changes in its investment approval policy in select manufacturing sectors, imposed a time frame of 60 days to clear applications of a selected nature, and allowed some small non-controlling investments under the automatic route.
Before that, it had eased business visa requirements for Chinese technicians and professionals and also eased some restrictions on Chinese machinery imports. At the same time, Indian officials continue pressing Beijing on market access, the trade imbalance, and predictable supply chains. The message rings clearer: Economic engagement can be made possible, but economic dependence cannot be made into strategic vulnerability.
COMPETITION HAS NOT DISAPPEARED
Even if the border remains stable, the larger India–China competition will continue.
Both countries are major Asian powers with overlapping interests across the Indian Ocean, South Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. An expanding strategic engagement between India and the United States, along with India's involvement with the Quad, is going to be a crucial factor for China's consideration. Nevertheless, the connection between China and Pakistan, along with its growing influence in the Indian neighbourhood, continues to be one of the enduring issues for India.
The rivalry also extends beyond geography. There is increasing competition between India and China when it comes to manufacturing, emerging technology, rare earths, and global influence. Both seek more influence in the process of institution-building in a world becoming more multipolar in nature. That makes a return to the old assumption that expanding trade will automatically generate political trust increasingly difficult.
Rather, economic and geopolitical relations will probably follow a parallel course: cooperation where interests coincide, competition where aspirations clash, and deterrence when security interests are at stake.
NEITHER RESET, NOR RUPTURE
India therefore appears to be searching for a middle space between two extremes. One is the diplomatic reset in general, based on the assumption that economic engagement can resolve the fundamental issues between them. The other one would be prolonged confrontation and economic isolation, something that would be extremely expensive for two adjacent economies with strong economic ties still existing.
Controlled competition offers a third possibility. This implies resuming air travel, business operations, and diplomacy without denying the existence of strategic competition. This means sourcing Chinese equipment wherever required while developing their substitutes domestically. And this implies improving border management mechanisms while maintaining military readiness along the LAC.
The sustainability of this system will be determined by how well both sides manage to stop individual grievances from degenerating into another systemic breakdown. Goyal's formula thus represents more than just trade policy. India is ready to open its doors again to China, but it is not about to leave them unlocked anymore.
The emerging India–China relationship may not be defined by friendship or permanent confrontation. Alternatively, it will increasingly be one of managing an inevitable situation: two emerging great powers that do not entirely trust each other, cannot afford to completely disregard each other economically, and cannot afford for their rivalry to get completely out of hand.
BY HEMAPRIYA
TEAM GEOSTRATA
.png)




Comments