India, Gulf, and The New Balance: Powers That Won't Pick Sides
Former UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, during the Bloomberg New Economy Forum 2026 in New Delhi on Tuesday, spoke about the growing imbalance of power and stability, and said that countries that were once expected to choose sides are refusing to do so anymore. He also pointed out the decline of multilateralism and the rule-based system that once held it together, and that such an erosion of present systems has greatly fueled geopolitical uncertainty.

Illustration by The Geostrata
He highlighted that China’s rise as a strategic rival to the United States, across the domains of defense capabilities, technology, and economy, can be more than enough to redraw the geopolitical landscape. "Countries like India, like the Gulf, are now able to chart their own course," he said. "They are not always going to agree with the US or China. They're going to do what they want, and that's a new feature." His statement summed up what comes next. Is this claim a mere description of the current landscape, or is it a forecast?
AUTONOMY IS EVERPRESENT
India’s Russian crude oil imports hit a record high in July 2026, as per the data provided by Kpler, even though the US legislation allows tariffs up to 100 percent on those buying from Russian energy sources. This pattern isn’t new. India purchased Russia’s S-400 air defence systems while remaining closer to the United States. This purchase was portrayed as a sovereign decision, despite the US threatening us with sanctions under CAATSA.
This is similar to what the Gulf countries went through. Saudi Arabia sought Israeli intelligence against the Houthis, after Pakistan chose to stay out of the conflict. This is despite Pakistan being its defence-pact partner. Each of these is an instance of the State weighing its own interests above what the patron or the partner expects it to do. Prime Minister Modi, in the same forum, offered a similar diagnosis.
"Things that connected the world at one time are today being weaponised," he said, pitching India as the answer to this predicament, although this left a harder question to be answered. Can India deliver on this pitch, and if so, what are the steps it is taking, and what it needs to take?
THE GULF AS AN EXTENDED NEIGHBORHOOD
This question can partly be answered by looking towards India’s west. Under PM Modi, the Gulf has become a foreign-and-security-policy priority and an integral part of India’s “external neighborhood”, which shows New Delhi’s growing influence and interests. On paper, India converges with the Gulf states on issues related to radical insurgent groups, local stabilisation of countries like Yemen and Afghanistan, and the containment of Iran and Pakistan. Looking closer, there are also talks about seaports, maritime infrastructure, and port competition in the Western Indian Ocean. This is part of a larger design, since our Indo-Pacific policy is now being carried into the Western Indian Ocean, and the Gulf is where it runs into competition with China.
WHERE THE CAPITAL FLOWS Monetary flows reflect this strategy. India is now an increasingly attractive market. Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, have announced ambitious investments (approximately USD$100 billion and US$75 billion respectively), compared to Saudi Arabia’s previous investments to the tune of USD$3.2 billion by March 2022, and Qatar’s investments of USD$1.5 billion in the past year.
The flagship is the USD$44 billion Ratnagiri Refinery and Petrochemical project in Maharashtra, which is being jointly developed by Indian, Saudi Arabian and Emirati Oil Companies.
CORRIDORS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE
The Indian geo-economic push has drawn it into the I2U2 grouping and the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor). During PM Modi’s visit to the UAE, the two countries signed an inter-government framework agreement on IMEC, but any action on it was delayed due to the Palestinian conflict. This was a stark reminder that projects regarding connectivity are only as secure as the regions they are based in, and the geographies they cross.
THE WIDER SCALE OF THE SHIFTING ORDER
The United States is adapting to the foundations of its previously structured global influence, to a world shaped by technological disruption, geopolitical rivalry, and the ever-shifting energy dynamics, as seen in instances cited above. China has become the world's leading manufacturing power and a hub for global supply chains. Alternative payment mechanisms seem to be increasing (case in point, UPI), and countries have started experimenting with non-dollar energy transactions. Meanwhile, public debt in the US seems to be climbing sharply, thereby raising questions about the durability of dollar assets and their global demand.
The Gulf crisis has also unveiled a vulnerability that Beijing is facing. China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil, mostly sourced from the Persian Gulf and shipped across the Indian Ocean. Chinese strategists call this the “Malaccan Dilemma”: the potential risk of China’s energy supply lines being disrupted at a maritime chokepoint. The security of the Gulf, thus, has greater importance, as it could have repercussions not only in the global market, but also on the balance of power in Asia.
This, however, does not affect China’s manufacturing, infrastructure development and mineral processing capacities significantly, since it is also expanding economic partnerships across Asia, Africa and Latin America, while also promoting alternative financial agreements.
INDIA'S POSITION IN THE OCEANS
Our growing technological capabilities and steadily expanding economy leave us well placed to benefit from diversification of our global supply chains. Partnerships in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, digital infrastructure, and critical minerals could strengthen our strategic standing. The geography is an added plus point. The sea lanes linking the Persian Gulf to East Asia run directly across the Indian Ocean, which is an artery of the world’s energy trade, and India sits near the midpoint of these routes. Helping to secure these maritime routes and corridors could be our most significant contribution to global stability.
ALIGNMENT, NOT ALLEGIANCE
New partnerships and alignments such as the I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE and USA) and BRICS expansion talks are instances of India’s evolving diplomacy. To build on them further, India must deepen political dialogue, expand its security cooperation, and diversify its trade beyond just hydrocarbons, as multiple sources would improve our energy access, investment links, and geopolitical influence in a multipolar world. Not to mention that it will reduce dependency on a single supplier, offering more leverage.
The constraints, however, will remain, since the US maintains deep security ties with the GCC states. India can go through with trilateral cooperation, but it would require extreme diplomatic caution. On the other hand, China’s Belt and Road Initiative investment opens trade opportunities for these countries, thereby limiting and challenging India’s influence.
It is worth reiterating that the diffusion of power has created a multipolar world in which India can engage with several partners for strategic and economic gain. The GCC is doing the same; diversifying across China, India, and Russia along with the US. Thus, we require a nuanced diplomacy, which can ensure India’s influence without dependency on a single power.
The solution, which is still not quite quantified or exact but is pragmatic, is to pursue partnerships without entering into any exclusive alignment, to use trade and technology as leverage, and to hold to non-alignment when energy, trade, and security are at stake. Whether India can make this solution applicable is the question; a question that the New World will answer.
BY PRANEEL
TEAM GEOSTRATA
.png)




Comments