top of page

Assemble and Resemble: Why Indian Technology Transfers Transfer the Right to Resemble, Not the Right to Develop?

1 day ago
7 min read

The Indian Army serves the nation with pride, with DRDO and private-sector ingenuity periodically aiding Indian defense development. On the contrary, every single fighter jet India has assembled since the 1960s required an engine India could not build. The MiG-21 ran on a Soviet engine. The Jaguar ran on a Rolls-Royce engine, licensed and built at HAL. The Tejas, the legendary indigenous fighter, still runs on the American GE F404, with the successor contracted to run on the GE F414.


Illustration by The Geostrata


India has tried for years but failed to co-develop or absorb this engine technology for decades. This is the story of just a few nationally touted assets, but it is also the larger story of the Indian approach to technology. India has been remarkably good at putting things together, but remarkably underwhelming at owning parts that actually make them work. 


ASSEMBLY VS ORIGINATION


What India calls a manufacturing success quietly covers the distinction between assembly and origination. Defence joint ventures, the PLI scheme and pharma “innovations” have all been announced as leaps towards self-reliance. However, on closer look, each element has produced an economic framework very good at putting together foreign components and naming it development.


Indian firms have historically preferred to license predictable, proven foreign technology rather than invest in slower and riskier work of their own. From the firm’s perspective, this is a rational choice because the new defense procurement rules provide security of profits, and foreign IP is bankable and de-risked. However, on a national level, India has been locked into permanent technological tenancy. 


TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS VS TECHNOLOGY ABSORPTION


While technology transfer agreements provide foreign hardware, blueprints, and production rights, technology absorption is much harder. Technology absorption involves internalising the engineering knowledge well enough to modify, iterate, and export it. India has been excellent at the former rather than the latter. 


South Korea’s absorption of shipbuilding and battery chemistry, or Japan's assimilation of automotive engineering in the 1960s-1970s, succeeded because these transfers were paired with mandatory local R&D co-investment, protected domestic demand, and firms being graded on design iteration rather than the Indian approach with unit assembly. Brahmos does stand as India’s rare success because it came through a joint design authority, not a licensed kit. 


Contrasting this with the Su-30MKI, India assembled thousands of units under a Russian license yet never gained the authority it needed to redesign avionics or engines according to Indian needs. The Kaveri engine program carried decades of funding but no absorption pathway, as DRDO lacked metallurgical and testing infrastructure. 


 STUDYING THE NUMBERS


India’s gross expenditure on R&D has been set at roughly 0.6-0.65% of GDP for over a decade, as compared to 2-3% in China, 3-4% in the United States, and 5-7% in Israel.

Underneath this underwhelming number is that the private sector contributes to only 36% of the Indian R&D expenditure compared to 70% in the US and China. In these economies, the number is higher because there is an explicit expectation to own what comes out of the research. In India, the government still carries most of the load, which is a reasonable proxy for how few Indian firms see deep R&D as a commercial bet worth making. 


Secondly comes the Indian mirage of patents. In 2023, Indian residents filed more patents than foreign entities for the first time. While in isolation, this is a genuine and rather hard-earned shift after newer education policies and a decade of growth. However, amongst the patents actually granted that year, an overwhelming majority were awarded to non-residents. The gap between patent filing and actually getting a patent granted portrays the Indian reality.


India has evidently learned consistent generation of paperwork for innovation without the required institutional power, examiner capacity, or R&D depth to convert these filings into defensible intellectual property that can be utilised as a national asset. India had only 221 patent examiners in 2023 against nearly 8,200 at the USPTO. 


Finally, the PLI scheme, India’s flagship attempt to bolster the Make in India initiative and open the doors to Indian manufacturing, shows an underwhelming reality. By October 2024, PLI firms produced only 37% of the actual targeted output, with the government disbursing roughly only 8% of the allocated incentives. Even the massive $31 billion commitment for the semiconductor sector has yet to produce even one fully operational fabrication plant. Amongst the sectors that did perform well in pharma and mobile phones, the truth remains that even before this scheme and without these incentives, India was growing in these areas anyway.


This growth too was restricted to merely formulating and assembling rather than designing or innovating at scale. Solar, automobile components, textiles, and IT hardware, where genuine capability and manufacturing capacity were needed rather than a push towards assembly, lagged badly to the point that the government let the scheme lapse in 2025 rather than try to renew it. 


WHAT IS 'MANUFACTURING'?


A great deal of political capital and policy energy has been invested in portraying assembly as manufacturing in India. Notions of ‘value addition’ are often satisfied by local packaging, testing, or merely final screw-driving stages that add cosmetic changes without coming into meaningful contact with the actual engineered content of the product. A phone, supposedly ‘manufactured’ in India, may still source its chipset, display driver, camera design, and firmware almost entirely from abroad, with domestic contribution limited to assembly and perhaps quality testing.


Defence indigenisation lists in India cover thousands of products. These lists also count a locally sourced bolt or a repainted subsystem with the same weight as a locally designed, actually innovative radar. The self-reliance index that India had set for itself in 1990, targeting 70% indigenous content in defence procurement by 2005, has still not been met even in 2026. The dual loss caused by the relabeling of assembly as manufacturing causes the public to be misled; secondly, as long as the primary motive works, it removes the political incentive to fund the harder, slower, and more valuable work which could actually make the label truthful. 


THE INDIA-OEM MISSED OPPORTUNITY 


The stronger failure beyond capability itself has been targeted. India has rarely even targeted the kind of narrow, niche, deep technology that foreign OEMs would want to license from India in some capacity. Every aspirational, growth-oriented nation today boasts some sliver of technology so well built that nations in global trade have no real choice other than buying into it.


Commendable examples like Israeli precision optics, Korean battery chemistry, Taiwanese fabrication processes, and Japanese, Chinese, or Korean shipbuilding all satisfy this notion and are national assets for the host nation. The Indian failure lies in the incentive structure. 

Indian firms continue to chase the safe, provable, and consistent margin of assembling existing foreign IP rather than the uncertain and capital-intensive ownership of a unique niche. The result is a country that exports enormous volumes of services and of assembled hardware, but little to no indigenously proprietary hard technology that a foreign OEM would need to come and license. 


WHERE DO THESE TRANSFERS ACTUALLY STOP? 


This is the stage where the fighter engines come back into the discourse. Technology transfer agreements, be it from the Soviets, the Russians, the French, or even the Americans, at best, have stalled at the SKD or semi-knocked-down level or CKD or completely-knocked-down level. India gets the kits to assemble, sometimes the right to manufacture components locally, but not the underlying authority to modify the design to suit Indian needs. 


Even Russia, today or during the Soviet era, being arguably the strongest Indian ally since independence, has rarely transferred the freedom to redesign a platform for the rather distinct Indian terrain, climate, or even the operational needs in Ladakh’s altitude, the Himalayan cold, and tropical humidity on coasts.


This gap remains a critical reason why India is unable to access the SU-57 for operational use today despite multiple Russian offers. The Kaveri engine programme, meant to provide India with the design authority for jet propulsion, ran for over three decades without an engine that could be used for the Tejas. 


Ultimately, what gets transferred is not technology, but rather the right to build. Indian industrial policy across nearly all sectors in this regard has failed to understand that this right to build and resemble is not the same as the right to think and innovate.


Beyond this, since all IP remains foreign-owned, there is no residual return on investment to be made by Indian firms or the government to license technology onward or to improve it to export as its very own, the way countries buy BrahMos precisely because that one is jointly, genuinely owned. Indian technology holds the potential for BrahMos to be the norm and not the exception, but the lack of political will and risk-taking incentive has rendered the sector a passive one, ready to assemble and resemble but not build. 


WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE? 


Every reform needed in the system ultimately requires changing the incentive structure it currently provides. R&D spending needs to move on from being a good-faith model and towards something where the private sector has real tax and procurement reasons to fund itself. Technology transfer agreements across sectors should be structured so that design modification rights, and not just production rights, are part of the negotiations. Patent examination capacity needs to grow by an order of magnitude so that Indian filings convert into Indian grants at a rate that matches Indian effort. The government should also provide higher incentives for granted patents than for patent filings to ensure it becomes a priority for firms and educational institutions. 


India lacks the patience to do this, rather than the capacity and capital discipline to fund the expensive and uncertain research that produces profitable assets for further monetisation beyond Indian borders. Until that changes, the country will keep announcing tech transfers in the name of development. While this was the right step in the age of Lal Bahadur Shastri, in the modern era, it acts as a nation choosing to avoid risks that can actually put it on the path of development. 


BY KRISH

TEAM GEOSTRATA

Comments


bottom of page