Ankara’s Strategic Gambit: Balancing Contradicting Foreign Policy

For years, Ankara balanced its position on the agenda of air defence systems while being constantly tested by both sides. On one hand, it acquired the Russian-made S-400 Triumf long- and medium-range anti-aircraft missile system, and on the other, it continued its appeal to Washington about its interest in obtaining access to American F-35 Fighter jets.

Illustration by The Geostrata

The contradiction deepened as Ankara insisted on keeping the American F-35, while Washington insisted that the use of the S-400 would give the Russians data on the stealth capabilities of the F-35; nevertheless, the retaliation from Washington came as expected, with sanctions lasting for more than 5 years. 

By any conventional reading of alliance politics, Turkey should have paid a steep and lasting price for its actions. But on the contrary, in July 2026, US President Trump stood beside President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara and announced that, in the near future, the sanctions are going to be lifted, followed by F-35 sales coming back on the table for discussion. 

There are two possible factors that caused this immediate change to take place: the first is Turkey’s foreign policy on this particular issue, and the second is a less discussed force in international relations.

THE ORIGINAL STANDOFF 

The trouble started brewing in 2019, when the Turkish government took delivery of the Russian-made S-400 missile defence system. The S-400’s radar is built to track and target stealth aircraft, causing the Pentagon to argue that letting Turkey operate it alongside the F-35 would indirectly hand Moscow a way to study the jet’s stealth signature from inside.

This argument was accepted, and Washington swiftly began unwinding Turkey from the F-35 program and imposed sanctions on the nation’s defence procurement agency under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, a law Congress had passed in 2017 specifically to punish significant arms deals with Russia.

A related provision in the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act even made it harder, barring the transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless there was adherence to statutory requirements related to the S-400 and Turkey's subsequent Russian defence purchases.

The above measures did not cause the matter to settle down; instead, Turkey did not give up the system and also never stopped requesting the jets.

This persistence is the first clue as to how Ankara was beginning to align itself strategically. The Turkish government heavily focused on persuasion as it waited for the clock to run out and Washington to give in.

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC STANCE

Over time, it was observed that the nation's refusal to fully align with either Washington or Moscow was not indecision; rather it was the policy itself. Ankara possesses a genuinely rare geographic and institutional intersectional advantage. It is a NATO member with a Black Sea coastline, shares a land border with Syria and Iran, and maintains a working relationship with Russia on everything from energy to Syria to grain shipments.

A country in this position has something most NATO members don't, which is real alternatives. In international relations, scholars have termed this approach of non-alignment as hedging: rather than balancing against a threat by joining one bloc, or bandwagoning by fully joining the stronger side, a state deliberately keeps its options open.

Turkey has practiced this time and again for years. One of the notable examples where the state deployed this approach was when Turkey procured Russian energy and weapons while remaining in NATO. It positioned itself as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war rather than joining sanctions regimes and courted Gulf and Chinese investment alongside Western capital.

The S-400 purchase, seen through this lens, was never merely about air defence but also about sovereignty.

It signaled that Turkey would not be dictated to when it comes to supplier selection, even by its most important military ally. The July 2026 announcement is the clearest evidence of the patient waiting and constant persuasion paying off. Furthermore, the mechanism reportedly being discussed does not require Turkey to destroy or return the S-400, preserving the nation's previous investments.

It just needs Turkey to move it out of Turkish hands. Speculations from the talks indicate that Turkey's S-400s, many of which remain in their original shipping containers, may be handed over to a third party as part of the arrangement. However, on the other end, Washington's political scenario is not fully supporting this decision.

President Trump’s pledge has set up a new fight with Congress, since the sanctions are codified in law and any move to terminate them triggers a congressional review that gives lawmakers a chance to object. Apart from internal opposition, few nations in the West are also not in agreement with this decision. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly urged the U.S. not to sell the F-35s to Turkey.

THE MISSING VARIABLE

There is one more dimension to this deal that pure strategic-interest analysis tends to underweight, and it is the second reason behind Turkey’s success. This concerns the personal relationship that Trump and Erdoğan share. The move was described as a significant gesture from Trump towards a leader he considers a close ally.

By agreeing with Erdoğan, Trump signals a willingness to remove a long-standing irritant that was previously present in the bilateral ties. This dimension matters because it points to a real, if often understated force in International Relations which showcases how leader-level rapport can shape state behaviour in ways that formal institutions and stated national interests do not fully predict.

Congress passed CAATSA nearly unanimously; the NDAA provision is federal law, multiple lawmakers and a close regional ally have objected publicly, yet a president chose to spend political capital and align with the other side.

Reversing his own government's stated position because of how he personally regards his counterpart. This episode has caused many onlookers to question their previously existing rigid perception of “Foreign Policy and how it is formulated.”

Rather than being formed after loads of rational calculations by interchangeable officials and then being adapted as a less temporary depiction of national interest that must not change with the fluctuating portfolios and governments, on the contrary, acts like these are a reminder that it does not always follow the above-defined model. Sometimes it does take into account the leader's stance, their personal warmth, grievances, and loyalties. 

PATH FORWARD

Turkey bore the sweet fruit of its manifestation while Washington watched the political winds turn into a cyclone of opposition. This situation has indeed turned a supposed liability into a proof of concept. What now remains crucial is the way other middle powers shall draw out their respective conclusions and implement them. The idea of trying out hedging is lucrative, but if not done carefully, as in Ankara, the repercussions might outweigh the positive predictions.

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BY SAANVI BANYANA

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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