Broken Wings? Not Yet. Russia’s Grey Market Aviation Game

In February 2022, Russia began an invasion of Ukraine. And as a response, the West implemented extensive aviation sanctions through the governments and aircraft OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) Boeing, Airbus, etc, by shutting down leases.

Illustration by The Geostrata

Russia responded by re-registering foreign aircraft in Russia.

The re-registration effectively nationalised the aircraft, and termination and immediate cessation of support from maintenance to spare parts from the OEMs took place. Even China has started to cease aircraft spare parts exports to Russia.

Logically, if you do not have new parts, aftermarket maintenance, or even valid legal ownership of the aircraft, then the Russian airlines would be grounded, and most importantly, the aviation industry would be unable to fly. However, in practice, Russia continues to operationally fly their own fleets of Boeing and Airbus jets - particularly Aeroflot and its subsidiary Pobeda. 

LEASE CANCELLATIONS AND AIRCRAFT SEIZURE

Prior to sanctions, there were approximately 515 Western-built jets on lease to Russian carriers. When the sanctions were imposed, the leases were terminated. The Russian government countered by invoking emergency statutes that permitted airlines to re-register leased aircraft in Russia. This act prevented foreign lessors from repossession. Thus far, Western lessors have filed insurance claims to recoup losses. For instance, Air Lease Corp was paid over $328 million for jets that had been stranded in Russia.

1. MAINTENANCE WITHOUT OEM SUPPORT: THE “UNDERGROUND” ARSENAL

1.1. Cannibalisation and “ Frankenstein Fleets”

With no legitimate spare parts available, Russian airlines began to cannibalise aircraft in maintenance, meaning that they took one or more of their grounded or maintenance-failed aircraft apart to source parts for their other, working aircraft. By mid-2023, 25-30% of the jets in Russia were grounded. For example, budget airline Pobeda rationalised its fleet from 41 jets down to just 25 jets to save parts and keep as many units operating as possible. 

1.2. Smuggling and Parallel Imports

Russia has established a shadow network of almost 360 intermediaries established in places like the UAE, Turkey, China, Gabon, and other CIS states. These intermediaries source parts for Russia using fake end-user certificates, rerouted shipments, and third-party brokers. For example, U.S. investigations have identified smuggling operations like KanRus Trading in Kansas.

They illegally completed shipments of aviation electronics to Russia. 

Russian state aviation regulator Rosaviatsiya authorised Global Jet Technic, located in Dubai, to support maintenance under Russian jurisdiction for the Boeing and Airbus operated by airlines in Russia.

1.3. Domestic Production & Substitution

Due to shortages, Russia has sped up domestic production of non-critical aircraft parts, cabin fittings, air filters, galley components, etc, that are certified by Rosaviatsiya. While this will help with low-level maintenance, it does not substitute for critical parts, for example, the engine and avionics. Russia has not been completely independent with its own aircraft, the Sukhoi Superjet and MC‑21; domestically manufactured parts are still continuing, but not to the level of being independent.

2. REGULATORY EASING & OPERATIONAL RISKS

2.1. Extension of Certifications

The Russian authorities have taken a laissez-faire approach and made regulatory concessions, allowing airlines to fly longer without damage. Airworthiness certificates are extended without a timeline limit, and airlines can postpone scheduled maintenance processes. While this extends the use of aircraft, this adds operational risk.

2.2. Safety Concerns Hidden by Lack of OEM Transparency

The fact that aircraft are flying without OEM parts and OEM technical support is a safety issue.

Consequently, investigative reports indicate that over 2,000 flights in a single year operated with expired or non-certified spare parts.

Safety incidents have tripled since the onset of sanctions, as the list of published emergencies and/or forced landings, that were due to hydraulic or engine-related incidents, has increased dramatically.

2.3. Deferred Deep Maintenance

The "deep" maintenance tasks - C and D checks, which happen every 2 to 6 years, for example, require specialist equipment and specialised personnel. Without support from Boeing or Airbus, there are no certified facilities in Russia capable of performing deep maintenance. Consequently, operationally, many aircraft will hit an operational dead-end by 2025-26.

3. THE PROGRESSIVE FLEET STRATEGY

3.1. Utilising the Younger Fleets

The commercial fleet in Russia consists of about 793 aircraft. They are relatively young, with the average age of the Airbus aircraft averaging around 10 years, and the Boeing aircraft averaging about 14 years. In addition, many aircraft remained unused during the pandemic, meaning that their parts were not being used or were very slightly worn. Airlines routinely fly a varying degree of newer planes and use the older aircraft for parts.

3.2. Maintaining Functionality Over Time

With an effective approach to parts cannibalization, simplified maintenance, and smuggled imports, Russia has enough functionality in its airlines to operate about 70% of the aircraft in its fleet. This is tenable in the short term, but as maintenance and upkeep become required for aircraft airworthiness, the aircraft will eventually not be airworthy.

4. THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK: FRAGILE AND RISKY

4.1. Safety & Reputational Damage 

The consequences of sanction evasion that were highlighted earlier, around reputation damage, are having an impact on Russian aviation.

The increasing occurrence of technical failures and inept regulatory processes has made the public suspicious of Russian-operated flights and is attracting international attention.

Flights that are operated from Russia have difficulty obtaining insurance because they do not have a clear, up-to-date history of the aircraft's maintenance records and have no documents from the OEM or backing them.

4.2. Technical Bottlenecks

Even with Russia's domestic production plans, it currently does not possess the ability to duplicate or procure complex components like engines, flight control systems, or avionics. These are true hard stop components for aircraft maintenance, and there is no way to smuggle or substitute something else.

4.3. Domestic Aircraft as a plan B 

The Russian government promotes the domestic production of new aircraft like the Yakovlev MC-21 and Sukhoi Superjet 100, and wants 20% of the local fleet to be made by 2030. Many of these aircraft will still have Western-made components and appear to be getting further and further behind.

A HIGH-WIRE ACT

Even with once inconceivable sanctions, Russia’s aviation sector continues to operate using several tactics for its Western jets: seizing aircraft on lease, cannibalising from grounded aircraft, smuggling parts, regulatory leniency, and partially domestic substitutions. This hodgepodge of options has enabled operations to continue, but it cannot last.

By 2025–26, without a restoration of OEM support or a fully localised substitute, much of Russia's existing fleet could face enforced removal from service. Until then, the country is balancing between engineering improvisation and escalating operational risk, much like other sanctioned nations like Iran and Venezuela.

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BY MUSKAN

TEAM GEOSTRATA

info@thegeostrata.com