The CPEC Conundrum : How Balochistan’s Insurgency and TTP’s Rise Intersect

The launch of a Chinese-funded airport in Gwadar in Pakistan’s Balochistan province has been delayed due to the coordinated attack by the Baloch Liberation Army (a Baloch separatist group) on August 26th, 2024 which resulted in the death of over 70 people  including military personnel and civilians.

Illustration by The Geostrata

Militants over the years have carried numerous such attacks on the US$65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)’s project sites. CPEC, the multi-billion dollar project aiming to enhance connectivity between China and Pakistan begins in Kashgar, China and illegally traverses through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir into Pakistan with the Port of Gwadar in Balochistan serving as its southern terminus.

It runs through several districts of Balochistan- Kech, Panjgur and Gwadar.  Despite being a potentially promising project, the local Baloch people view CPEC as benefiting foreign investors rather than the local population.

The marginalization of the local Baloch together with state-sponsored discriminatory practices have fuelled the rise of insurgents demanding greater Balochi autonomy or even outright independence

Despite being endowed with significant natural resources such as natural gas, coal, copper and gold, it is ironic that the region is one of the least developed in Pakistan. Balochistan stands at the highest poverty level with an Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of 71.2% compared to the Pakistani national average of 38.8%.

The region characterized by high unemployment rates, low education rate, inadequate skills developments together with the political lassitude of the Pakistani Government towards the region's development have been the cause of the creation of fertile breeding grounds for insurgents and armed groups.

Major insurgents groups include the Balochistan Liberation Army, Balochistan Liberation Front as well as the Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which  have carried numerous attacks on both Pakistani security forces and Chinese personnel involved in the CPEC projects.

While CPEC promises development, much of the returns of this development are being allotted to foreign investors directly benefiting Chinese interests rather than upgrading the conditions of the local Baloch population. 

Baloch people argue that most of the mega developmental projects such as the Gwadar Port fail to favor the development of the local population. Instead, state authorities and Pakistani bureaucratic elite are taking the lion's share from these projects leaving only minimal profits for Balochistan.

For instance, the Gwadar Port leasing rights was transferred to the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) in 2013, which holds 91% of the profit while depriving the province of Balochistan of economic returns.

Additionally, the construction of the port has also encroached upon local access to the sea and the local lands were sold at low prices. Despite being a development project it has had the opposite effect in Balochistan by creating limited local employment and bringing in non-baloch migrants to work. 

The local population  criticizes that the non-Baloch have been given more jobs in order to infiltrate the region with another ethnicity such as the Punjabis and Sindhis in order to change the ethnic makeup of the province, thereby providing the Pakistani state with a strategic superiority over the insurgents.

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Economic deprivation, resource exploitation,  lack of political representation and the harsh military measures used by the Pakistani Government to suppress dissent and grievances of the locals have motivated rebels against the state turning frustration into violent attacks. 

INVOLVEMENT OF TTP

Over the past years the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has also expanded its  operational influence in Balochistan thereby exacerbating the issue of insurgency and targeted terrorist attacks.

TTP whose main ideology closely aligns with the Afghan Taliban have traditionally operated near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These include the erstwhile ‘Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province and South Waziristan.

However, since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 , the TTP has significantly expanded its base in Balochistan which were earlier restricted to Pashtun belts. The TTP was previously reluctant to operate in Balochistan following the presence of veteran Taliban leaders in Quetta who established the ‘Quetta Shura’, a leadership council based in Quetta comprising of senior Taliban leaders.

However the outflow of the Afghan Taliban leaders back to Kabul and  the subsequent influx of Pashtun refugees increasing the Pashtun population in the region favored the grounds for ingress of TTP into Balochistan.

Since then, the TTP has made significant inroads into two districts of the Balochistan province: Zhob, which has a considerable Pashtun population was included under TTP’s new ‘Wilayat’ (or administrative division) in 2022 and recently the Kalat- Makran Wilayat which is predominantly settled by the ethnic Baloch.

Kalat-Makran Wilayat, a new addition to TTP’s strongholds led by TTP’s Shaheen Baloch marks the TTP’s growing organization beyond its traditional strongholds. This ingress has been facilitated by the exploitation of Baloch emotional appeal against their oppression. 

Moreover, it has also capitalized on specific incidents such as Barkhan tragedy where three bodies of a woman and her son were recovered from a well near Abdul Rahman Khetran’s residence , the Balochistan Minister for Communication which led to widespread protest by the Marri Tribe.

This incident further solidified TTP’s position as a ‘supposed champion’ of Baloch cause against the Pakistani state-led oppression.  

TTP has absorbed local armed groups such as the ones of Aslam Baloch, Mazari Baloch, Akram Baloch and Asim Baloch which have pledged their allegiance to TTP. These mergers and close coordination of Baloch groups with TTP has facilitated Baloch groups to adopt tactics of TTP such as the suicide bombing, receive military training and gain access to TTP-acquired weapons and equipments from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan such as the M24 sniper rifles, M4 carbines with Trijicon ACOG scopes, and M16A4 rifles with thermal scopes.  

It provides a cumulative capability to the Baloch Army to carry out brutal attacks on Pakistani security forces and forge targeted attacks on CPEC sites. The Quetta-Dera Ismail Khan highway, a part of the Zhob wilayat, is a part of CPEC’s western route and the Kalat- Makran waliyat in turn includes Gwadar.

Although most attacks are carried out by Baloch armed groups, there have been instances where the TTP has also targeted Chinese sites. For instance the March 26, 2024 attack by a suicide bombing terror-strike on Chinese-built Dasu hydropower project, killed five Chinese nationals.

TTP’s expansion into Balochistan has also facilitated the growing nexus between TTP and Baloch militant groups to carry targeted attacks on CPEC project sites. 

The attacks in Balochistan against CPEC are thus a manifestation of broader issues such as the resource exploitation by foreign state actors without  providing economic benefits to the locals, state and military repression of the Baloch identity which have  provided the space necessary for other terrorist groups such as the TTP to exploit local grievances and gain prominence in the region.  

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BY SIBANI

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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