The Covert Affairs of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Espionage, Allies and Power

According to 2025 data from the Arms Control Association, the world’s nuclear-armed states collectively possess over 12,400 nuclear warheads, with nearly 90% held by Russia and the United States. This article explores how clandestine operations, strategic alliances, and espionage shaped the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Illustration by The Geostrata

The genesis of covert nuclear proliferation begins with the Manhattan Project by the US, which led to the creation of the world’s first Atomic Bomb, which was used against Japan in 1945, leading to the end of World War II.

Simultaneously, the Soviet Union was running a covert espionage operation intending to infiltrate the American program. Through infiltration, Soviet agents obtained critical blueprints and technical data related to both atomic and hydrogen bomb designs. This intelligence windfall accelerated the Soviet nuclear program, allowing it to successfully test its first atomic bomb in 1949, making it the world’s second nuclear power. 

The UK played a significant role in the Manhattan Project and had an agreement with the US to share technology once it was completed and agreed not to use it against each other. However, in 1945 when the US successfully tested its nuclear weapons, it also terminated the agreement with the UK. Despite this setback, it resumed its own nuclear program as they already made significant progress and controlled most of the world’s uranium. In 1952, the UK successfully tested its first Atomic Bomb.

PROJECT 596 AND BEYOND

Whereas China’s nuclear rise was both a reaction to Western hostility and Soviet betrayal, recognising China’s strategic value. At first the USSR offered substantial support to China, including training scientists, supplying reactor blueprints and sharing nuclear research under the Sino-Soviet cooperation agreements.

However, this partnership soured dramatically by the late 1950s, known as the Sino-Soviet Split, which lead to the withdrawal of all Soviet aid by 1959, stalling China's nuclear ambitions. The discovery of large domestic uranium reserves reduced its reliance on foreign supplies and enabled it to push forward with surprising speed in developing its nuclear programme.

In 1964, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb under Project 596 and tested a hydrogen bomb just three years later. China prioritised its nuclear ambitions, achieving the fastest transition from fission to fusion in history, amid economic turmoil and widespread famine.

STRATEGIC AUTONOMY THROUGH NUCLEAR FORCE

France’s emergence as a nuclear power in 1960 was driven by postwar decline and strategic betrayal during the 1956 Suez Crisis, when the United States and United Kingdom refused to support its intervention in Egypt. This pushed France to pursue an independent deterrent. Although a few French scientists had worked on the Manhattan Project under British supervision, their access was limited.

In subsequent years, France built an advanced civilian reactor network by the mid-1950s, which quietly enabled the accumulation of fissile material under the guise of peaceful nuclear development.

The foundation of Israel’s nuclear programme was laid in the 1950s, forged through deep clandestine cooperation with France. Israel is the only undeclared nuclear power in the world, and one of the most secretive nuclear acquisitions of the 20th century. During Israel’s nuclear programme, French support was based primarily on shared military interests in the Suez Crisis and viewed Israel as a key ally in the Middle Eastern.

This partnership helped Israel in constructing the Dimona nuclear facility- a reactor that was designed for plutonium production under the cover of ‘textile research.’ Although Israel presented the facility as a civilian project, US intelligence became increasingly suspicious in 1960.

The US government demanded full inspections by 1963, suspecting that Israel was pursuing the bomb. Israel stalled and manipulated inspections, constructing underground reprocessing labs to separate plutonium, which were deliberately hidden from American inspectors.

The real scope of the operation was revealed in 1986, when Mordechai Vanunu, a technician at the Dimona facility, gave photographic evidence and classified documents to the Sunday Times (UK).

These photographs confirmed that Israel had developed a formidable nuclear arsenal, which included thermonuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear programme proves how a small state can outmanoeuvre international non-proliferation regimes without public acknowledgement or open testing.

INDIA’S LONG DETERMINATION OF NUCLEAR POWER

India’s nuclear journey is unique, developing its nuclear program independently. Its nuclear journey began in the 1940s, with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission under Homi Bhabha. The programme was intended for peaceful energy use, with initial indirect assistance coming from Canada and the United States, which provided research reactors and fuel; this civil infrastructure also laid the foundation for dual-use capabilities.

India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, codenamed ‘Smiling Buddha,’ officially described as a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ (PNE). But, the decision not to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) intensified international criticism and heightened global concerns. 

In response to the test, India faced sweeping technology sanctions from the US and Canada, resulting in the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to restrict the export of advanced nuclear technology to non-signatories to the NPT, forcing India to develop enrichment, reprocessing, and weapons design capabilities all on its own and it became harder by constant US surveillance, including aborted test plans detected via satellite in late 1995. Despite these challenges, in 1998, India conducted its second nuclear test Pokhran-II, a series of five nuclear tests that signalled the formal weaponisation of its nuclear capability.

SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR RISE AND RETREAT

South Africa’s nuclear journey stands out as one of the most unusual in global history, not only because it successfully developed nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework but also it became the first and only nation to voluntarily dismantle them.

Its nuclear programme was driven by its vast uranium reserves and a covert partnership with Israel. South Africa initially pursued nuclear energy for civilian purposes in the 1960s and 70s before directly shifting to weaponisation. However, the apartheid regime supported by Western powers sought nuclear arms to counter Soviet-backed forces in Angola and Namibia.

By 1977, they had dug underground shafts in the Kalahari Desert and were preparing for a test. Although, Western countries had earlier supported its civilian nuclear infrastructure, the exposure of a 1977 test site in the Kalahari Desert by Soviet satellites, prompted both the US and USSR to pressure Pretoria to halt the operation, fearing destabilisation of the region.

Just two years later, in 1979, a “double flash” was detected by the US Vela satellites near the remote Prince Edward Islands, territory administered by South Africa. It has been widely interpreted as a joint Israeli-South African nuclear test, known as the ‘Vela incident’ which remains officially classified and is broadly viewed as evidence of Israeli involvement in exchange for uranium and access to testing facilities.

By the mid-1980s, South Africa had developed six Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs. The nation deliberately maintained nuclear ambiguity and just like Israel’s policy to deter threats without confirming possession.

Following the end of the Apartheid regime and the end of external threats in South Africa, concerns emerged over the new government's ability to secure its nuclear arsenal from ill-actors. To avoid the risk of proliferation, South Africa opted for transparency. In the early 1990s, it became the first country to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear arsenal, destroyed its designs, and placed its enriched uranium under IAEA safeguards.

PAKISTAN UNDER ESPIONAGE AND BLACK MARKETS

Pakistan’s nuclear ambition was crystallised in Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s defiant vow: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass, but we will get one of our own.” Pakistan had neither the resources nor the time to develop a programme from scratch. Instead, it turned to espionage and strategic alliances.

The country’s nuclear breakthrough came through Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist working at the Dutch Uranium Enrichment Consortium (URENCO). AQ Khan stole classified designs and supplier contacts, returning to Pakistan in 1976 with the blueprints for uranium centrifuges, laying the foundation of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment capability at Kahuta Research Laboratories.

During the 1980s, Pakistan became a key strategic ally in the US war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Despite mounting evidence of nuclear weapon development, the US turned a blind eye, prioritising Cold War geopolitics over non-proliferation.

Moreover, China played a critical role, providing bomb designs, testing data, and nuclear materials, viewing Pakistan as a counterweight to India. This state-to-state cooperation gave the programme legitimacy and strategic depth.

By the late 1980s, Pakistan had quietly assembled an arsenal but refrained from testing, until India’s (Pokhran-II), prompting Pakistan to conduct five underground tests in Chagai, becoming a declared nuclear power. AQ Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear programme confessed in 2004 about running a global black-market network, selling nuclear designs to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

This revelation sparked international outrage, not just because of the weapons sales, but because they had occurred under the nose of global surveillance for years. Pakistan’s nuclear journey succeeded despite international surveillance by leveraging its strategic relevance during the Cold War.

NORTH KOREA’S ISOLATION, DEFIANCE AND PERSISTENCE

As the Cold War intensified, North Korea sought to achieve nuclear parity with South Korea by leveraging its alliances within the communist bloc. The Soviet Union initially provided North Korea with scientific nuclear training and research assistance in the 1950s and early '60s, primarily to balance US influence in South Korea.

However, tensions rose as North Korea refused to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and openly voiced ambitions to match South Korea’s rapid nuclear progress. Despite being repeatedly denied advanced nuclear reactors by Moscow and its Eastern Bloc allies, North Korea proceeded to construct a graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon, capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

Further emboldened by China’s ambiguity and veiled assurance of tactical nuclear weapons, North Korea advanced its nuclear ambitions. By the 1980s, North Korea had mastered the dual-use fuel cycle, balancing civilian claims with weapons-grade ambitions. In essence, North Korea's nuclear success was a long-term strategy of exploiting rivalries, pressuring allies, and bypassing global treaties. 

IRAN’S REVOLUTION AND REACTORS

Although nine nations officially hold nuclear status, others have long harbored ambitions, advancing either openly or covertly beneath energy and strategic ambiguity. Among the most closely monitored is Iran, with suspicions of nuclear stockpiling tracing back to Western support during Shah's rule in the 1970s.  Iran’s nuclear infrastructure began with the US supplied reactors and French investments.

Following the post-revolution, the programme shifted underground, strategically benefiting from Chinese expertise in mining and conversion, and later from the AQ Khan black-market network, which supplied centrifuge designs and sensitive components during the 1980s and 1990s. 

Iran’s covert enrichment facility at Natanz and the heavy-water site at Arak were exposed in 2002 by dissidents. The covert ‘Amad Plan’ aimed to build five nuclear warheads and included explosives testing, warhead design, and Shahab-3 missile integration, all under military supervision.

While Iran halted the Amad Plan in 2003, it preserved its weaponisation knowledge. However, after the US withdrawal in 2018, Iran escalated its uranium enrichment, installed advanced centrifuges, and accumulated enough enriched uranium for multiple warheads.

Although Iran publicly claims its nuclear programme is peaceful under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), decades of clandestine enrichment, secret facilities, and military-linked research indicate a dual-track agenda.

SADDAM’S QUEST FOR THE BOMB

In the 1970s, Iraq's nuclear ambitions emerged under Saddam Hussein with a desire to assert its control over regional adversaries like Israel and Iran and to achieve its strategic supremacy in the Arab world. To support this goal, Iraq acquired the Osirak reactor from France under the guise of peaceful use in order to explore nuclear energy.

However, the Western and Israeli intelligence agencies believed that Iraq wanted to produce plutonium suitable for weapons using the reactor and it was expected to enable Iraq's first nuclear weapon, though Israel preemptively attacked and damaged the reactor in 1981. 

Following the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Baghdad launched a clandestine nuclear weapons programme by setting up front companies in Europe to acquire uranium enrichment equipment and recruiting technical experts from the German-Urenco consortium between 1988–1990.

However, the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent IAEA inspections uncovered Iraq’s secret weapons infrastructure, leading to its dismantlement under the oversight of the UN Security Council.

In the early 2000s, the US government alleged Iraq had resumed developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. But, after the 2003 US invasion, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and CIA investigations concluded that no active WMD programmes or stockpiles existed, though Saddam maintained the intent to restart them if sanctions were lifted.

Ultimately, Iraq’s nuclear programme was real, but by 2003, its weapons ambitions were more illusion than substance, making it one of the most consequential intelligence failures of the 21st century.

BLOCKED BY SABOTAGE AND STRIKES

Countries like Iraq, Syria, and Libya had all pursued nuclear weapons in the past, some with advanced infrastructure but were stopped through international intervention, sabotage and airstrikes, often led by Israel to preserve its nuclear dominance in the Middle East.

Image Credits: Rightful Owner

The global quest for nuclear weapons has been shaped by a mix of strategy, espionage, and survival-based partnerships. From Cold War-era covert operations to the post-colonial era’s strategic defiance, states have used every tool at their disposal, including technology theft, black-market networks, diplomatic tactics, and ambiguous civilian programmes to gain nuclear capability.

Today, nuclear deterrence is still a major part of international politics, even as efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons face challenges from hidden ambitions. The tale of WMDs is not just about science, but politics, fear, and the never-ending quest for strategic dominance in a divided world.

---

BY SHRUTI JAGTAP

TEAM GEOSTRATA

info@thegeostrata.com