Pakistan Army’s Strategic Culture: Why Pakistan’s Army Keeps The India-Pakistan Conflict Alive?

The pattern is all too familiar. A jihadi group operating from Pakistani soil, with state backing, carries out a terror attack on India. If the assault is particularly atrocious, India suspends diplomatic engagement while mulling more punitive responses, including strikes on terror safe havens inside Pakistan and adopting more proactive security doctrines aiming to inflict high costs on state-sponsors of terrorism. 

Illustration by The Geostrata

Pakistan, fearing its deterrence weakening, seeks external pressure on India by resorting to tactics like nuclear sabre-rattling. The international community, worrying about nuclear escalation, implores both sides to practice restraint and work toward peace, ultimately equating the victim and perpetrator of terrorism. Whether it was the 2025 Pahalgam attack, the 2019 Pulwama attack or the many gruesome attacks before that, the story has hardly changed. 

Continuous India-Pakistan engagement, backchannel talks, peace overtures from India, confidence-building measures, attempts at third-party mediation, and even military retribution have not yielded results and have sometimes proved counterproductive. Even a befitting Operation Sindoor did not deter Pakistan-based groups from allegedly planning low-intensity attacks like the recent Red Fort terror incident, once again taking innocent Indian lives. 

WHY IS THIS CONFLICT THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SEVERAL DECADES SO RESISTANT TO RESOLUTION Viewing this conflict through an ideological or security lens, as something that can eventually be put to an end, is an oversimplification of reality. To understand its complexity, it is crucial to examine the driving forces behind this turbulence. 

Since the 1947 partition of the sub-continent, Pakistan has viewed India as an existential threat, with India occupying a central position in Pakistan’s security and foreign policy. The insecurities of partition, vulnerable geography, Kashmir obsession, the notion of "Islam in danger," and the “strategic shock” of the 1971 humiliation together inform the foundations of this India-centric worldview of Pakistan. These insecurities shaped many of Pakistan’s security strategies, including wars with India, ideological tools to foster nationalism, and the use of proxy terror outfits under its expanding nuclear umbrella.

But what institutional actor formulates and sustains these strategies? The hard reality is that since partition, no political force has driven Pakistan's domestic and international agenda as coherently as has its army, and more specifically, its intelligence unit, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Successive military regimes and prolonged periods of indirect military control have institutionalised the army as the undisputed, indomitable and main power centre in Pakistan. And with the Army dominating most levers of power, Pakistan’s strategic culture has effectively become synonymous with the army’s strategic culture. 

It is this Pakistani deep state and its strategic culture that provide an appropriate prism for why hostility toward India has been deeply ingrained in the army’s psyche, why any diplomatic or military solution remains highly elusive and why Pakistan continues pursuing these strategies even though they have imposed a high cost on Pakistan, to the extent that they have imperilled the state’s viability. 

ARMY'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Jack Snyder has defined strategic culture as “sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired.” Christine Fair characterises four principal beliefs that undergird the Pakistan Army’s strategic culture:

(1) Pakistan is an insecure and incomplete state

(2) Afghanistan is a source of instability

(3) India rejects the two-nation theory and seeks to dominate or destroy Pakistan

(4) India is a regional hegemon that must be resisted.

PAKISTAN WAS BORN AN INSECURE AND INCOMPLETE STATE

This enduring belief stems from the way Britain executed the partition. Pakistan views it as an incomplete process, and as a result, it remains a staunchly revisionist state seeking to finish the “unfinished” process of partition and ultimately reinforcing Pakistan’s ideological and geographic frontiers. 

It seeks control over the entire territory of Kashmir, even though, under the terms of partition, Pakistan was never entitled to it. This erroneous sentiment is consistently reflected in the statements of Pakistan’s top generals, the most recent being Asim Munir, declaring Kashmir “the jugular vein of Pakistan.” 

This revisionism has implications for how the army uses force and other instruments of national power, motivating it to start wars in 1947, 1965, and 1999, all of which it failed to win, as well as to wage a proxy war on India. Two of Pakistan's “most successful proxies”, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), are considered strategic assets that operate with direct logistical and operational support from the ISI. 

It should not come as a surprise that Pakistan has sustained a proxy war in Kashmir since 1989, using Islamist terrorists, as well as supporting non-Islamist insurgencies throughout India, even though this strategy has backfired tremendously. According to Fair, Pakistan's use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool has turned into an overdependence, and with these proxies so deeply embedded into the social fabric of Pakistan's politics that even if their armed wings were shut, they would still find ways to function. Moreover, many of the homegrown militants nurtured by Pakistan as proxies have boomeranged against the nation itself.

AFGHANISTAN IS A SOURCE OF INSTABILITY

The second theme of the army’s strategic culture is its belief that it has inherited the most dangerous frontier of the British Raj: the Afghanistan border. The army perpetuates the image of Pakistan as a narrow strip of land bounded between Afghanistan, a source of instability and India, a regional hegemon that desires to overrun Pakistan.

This belief that Afghanistan could pose a two-front threat, either on its own or through Indo-Afghan collusion, led the army to rely on the policy of “strategic depth,” under which it has sought to cultivate a regime in Afghanistan that is favourably disposed toward Pakistan while being hostile to India. This has manifested in Pakistan’s long history of interference in Afghanistan, most prominently as a U.S. ally to prop up the Afghan Mujahideen against Soviet forces starting in 1979. 

Having gained quite extensive experience in guerrilla warfare by the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, the Army saw an opportunity to strategically use these tactics, weapons stockpiles and narcotics revenue to destabilise India. Hence, its military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, launched “Operation Tupac” to fuel insurgency and separatism in Kashmir. The combination of state support and an active arms-drug pipeline served as the perfect recipe for the army to create multiple proxies and attempt the integration of Kashmir into Pakistan, which, however, never came to pass. 

In 2001, when Pakistan joined the U.S.-led Global War on Terror, it played a double game by continuing to support the Taliban to achieve its elusive strategic depth. When the Taliban took over in 2021, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan called it Afghanistan breaking the shackles of slavery. Pakistan’s celebrations were, however, soon halted when the Taliban did not cooperate in acting against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 

In today’s reality, Pakistan’s relations with the once-deemed asset Taliban stand at a historical low. This has opened a diplomatic window for the Taliban to cultivate closer ties with India, which has forced Pakistani military planners to reconsider their security doctrine, including considering regime change in Afghanistan.

IDEOLOGICAL ISLAM AND EXISTENTIAL THREAT FROM INDIA

The third component of the army’s strategic culture is an unwavering conviction that India, opposed to the two-nation theory, cannot countenance Pakistan’s existence as a Muslim state and therefore seeks to dominate or destroy it. This belief was reflected early on in Ayub Khan’s writings, where he avowed that India is unable “to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign independent State….India was determined to make things difficult for us.” 

Under the two-nation theory, Islam is portrayed as that “one great loyalty, ” an ideology of and for Pakistan, a belief that should this ideology fail, the Pakistani state would fail as well. All Pakistani military dictators have actively promoted Islam to secure their legitimacy and have portrayed themselves as defenders of this ideology and thus, of Pakistan itself. General Zia ul-Haq stated, “The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim state, cannot become ‘professional’ if in all his activities he does not take on 'the colour of Allah.’" 

Husain Haqqani, a Pakistani expert, argued, “The ‘ideology of Pakistan’ has created a nexus between the ‘custodians of Islam’ and the country’s military….which sees itself as the guardian of the Pakistani state.” As Pervez Musharraf once proclaimed, the Army views itself as “the saviour of Pakistan… without it, the entity of Pakistan cannot exist.” 

The notion of Pakistan as a “Fortress of Islam” has also helped the army generate a foundational fear about India’s intentions. As a result, it depicts all conflicts with India as “defence” and even “defensive jihad,” despite initiating all the wars, and cultivating a public perception that these wars were fought not merely to defend Pakistan but to defend the edifice of Islam itself. 

To assert its superiority over other armies, the Pakistani Army has long relied on the admixtures of “martial race” theory and Islam to construct the perilous notion that it produces better “Muslim” soldiers. Haqqani observed that several military publications were “building the case that one Muslim soldier had the fighting prowess to subdue five Hindus”. The India-Pakistan rivalry is thus not simply geopolitical but also depicted as theological: a permanent Muslim resistance toward a “Hindu India.” 

Over the years, the army has embedded these radical moorings across Pakistan and even in Kashmir, particularly through Operation Tupac, which focused on radicalising the Kashmiri population. The entry of religiously motivated militants completely transformed the Kashmir issue, drawing even Pakistanis and Afghans who had no personal connection with Kashmir. By labelling this armed struggle as jihad, Pakistan made it difficult to resolve the issue politically. 

INDIA IS A REGIONAL HEGEMON THAT MUST BE RESISTED

Fourth, the army believes that India is a hegemon that poses an existential threat to Pakistan, both directly and indirectly, through collusion with neighbours and through its growing global influence. Again, Ayub Khan gave early voice to this by asserting that behind Indo-Pakistan hostility lies “India’s ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite…..Indian foreign policy was all directed towards one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration.”

This belief heightened Pakistan's prioritisation of national security, leading it to seek any leverage over its rival. Pakistan's early Cold War alignment with the U.S, seeking security through military pacts, courtship of China, and its pursuit of an arms race and nuclear weapons all stemmed from fears of inferiority. 

Ashley Tellis emphasises that its nuclear capabilities adversely resulted in a "stability-instability paradox," wherein nuclear deterrence allows its military to underwrite a campaign of proxy terrorism while preventing major wars.

In "Soft Balancing," T. V. Paul contends that Pakistan's strategic partnerships with China and Türkiye, along with its membership in organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), are strategies to counterbalance India's rise, as was evident during Operation Sindoor, when China and Türkiye provided kinetic and intelligence support to Pakistan.

A “GARRISON STATE”

At the time of Pakistan’s birth, Lord Mountbatten, India’s last British viceroy, stated, “As far as Pakistan is concerned, we are putting up a tent. We can do no more." Commenting on this statement, Ayesha Jalal, a historian, wrote, “Instead of being replaced by a permanent building, the proverbial tent has been metaphorically transformed into a sprawling military barrack”. 

Stephen Cohen, an expert on Asian security, categorised world armies into three categories: armies that guard borders, armies that protect their own position in society, and armies that defend a cause or an idea. As per Cohen, the Pakistan Army does all three. And this civil-military imbalance has only deepened over the years, with the army’s strategic culture manifesting itself in full force, especially during periods of military rule. Whenever Army chiefs have usurped power, it has precipitated into a strident anti-India posture and conflict with India, both to secure legitimacy and to externalise dissent.

Ayub Khan began this rot by launching Operation Gibraltar in 1965, and his protégé Yahya Khan carried his legacy forward by worsening the 1971 crisis, which dismembered Pakistan and left its military nursing the humiliation of defeat. From this humiliation rose Zia-Ul-Haq, who brought the next phase of Pakistan’s descent into chaos.

By devising a strategy of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts”, Zia captured power in 1978 and went ahead with systematically guiding both the Pakistan Army and civil society on the path to “Islamisation.” Its impact was so profound that his anti-India stance impacted generations of Pakistani military officers and paved the way for a covert war against India. 

After Pakistan’s short stint with democracy, it was another ambitious Pakistan Army chief, Pervez Musharraf’s turn to oversee Pakistan’s descent towards a “rogue state.” Kargil misadventure, the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and Pakistan’s complete embrace of jihadis all happened under his watch.

Moreover, whenever Pakistan’s democratic institutions and civil society have attempted dialogue with India, the army has sabotaged these efforts since abandoning its baseless anti-India claims would diminish its domestic supremacy. Both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto felt hamstrung by the Army in pursuing talks with India.

The 1999 Lahore declaration, between Sharif and Vajpayee, was subverted by the Kargil conflict. The failure of the 2001 Agra Summit and Musharraf’s near-breakthrough in 2007-08 after significant backchannel diplomacy were soon followed by the 2001 Parliament attack and 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, respectively. 

Most analysts contend that the 2016 JeM’s Pathankot attack was similarly aimed at derailing a nascent peace process following the Indian PM's visit to Pakistan. Conveniently for the ISI, the attack stalled any diplomatic progress as India reiterated a clear position: terror and talks cannot go together.

A “SILENT COUP”

Where does Asim Munir stand in this unenviable list of generals? Through the recent 27th Constitutional Amendment, he has formally entrenched himself at the top of Pakistan’s constitutional structure, with many critics calling it a “quiet coup.” Unlike past eras of dramatic military takeovers, this time, Pakistan’s elected leadership has smoothly ceded civilian space, something likely permanent. 

In 2004, Cohen commented on the army’s role, that what started as a “benevolent babysitter” has later transformed into the all-encompassing role of “maa-baap” (mother-father). Two decades later, with Islamabad’s democratic façade thinner than ever, the question becomes where Pakistan stands today.

Additionally, today, Pakistan faces what experts call a “polycrisis,” where governance paralysis, security turmoil, and economic collapse reinforce one another. Traditionally, whenever there has been a crisis in Pakistan, the diversion has been fuelling conflict with India. And given the enduring nature of the Pakistan Army’s strategic culture, it is unwise to expect Pakistan to abandon this self-destructive path and usher in peace in the subcontinent.

CONCLUSION

For India’s policymakers, these developments mean recalibrating their security expectations, assessing whether an escalation with India is on Munir’s mind, and using the strategic culture as a lens to respond to the current situation. 

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s asymmetry with India is only set to widen. While India prepares to take on the mantle of global leadership, Pakistan wallows in being a militarised society, a fragile rentier economy, a den of obscurantist social milieu and a convenient pawn to external power’s expansionist designs.

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BY GARIMA ARORA

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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