Indo-Pacific in a Post-American Guarantee Era: Is Nuclear Risk Rising as U.S. Security Commitments Waiver?

It is a challenging time to be a US ally. America is withdrawing from its role as system administrator in favour of becoming just another self-interested great power. To make matters worse, an informal alliance of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, called the “Axis of Evil” by Western officials, is emerging. 

Illustration by The Geostrata

The region most anxious about these developments is the Indo-Pacific, the new theatre of great power competition. For Asia, Donald Trump’s high-handed, transactional diplomacy and reversal of Biden’s Ukraine policy raise an uncomfortable question: Can America still be trusted as a reliable security guarantor? 

This uncertainty comes when Asia’s own security dilemmas are deepening. China’s influence in this region dwarfs that of any other regional power in its respective spheres, like Russia in Europe or the U.S in the Americas. For instance, unlike Moscow, which lies on Europe’s edge, Beijing sits at Asia’s core, sharing borders and strategic waters with nearly every major regional player.

The result is a double whammy for Asian security. While the expectations of U.S allies such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the region are consistently increasing because of Chinese aggression, the US commitments are growing shaky.

AMERICA’S FATIGUE AND MULTIPOLARITY

The U.S has grown weary of the costs of maintaining global leadership and protecting distant allies. This fatigue has paved the way for Trump’s reelection, who has long asserted that the costs of US global leadership outweigh the benefits, burdening it with global policing and enabling its allies to play it for a sucker.

His Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, stated that other countries had “gotten used to a foreign policy in which you act in your national interest and we act in the interest of the global order… Under President Trump, we’re going to do what you do”.

This inward turn has reshaped U.S. foreign policy. During Trump’s first term, there was a remarkable shift in U.S. policy toward Asia, characterised by the development of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the revival of the Quad to counterbalance China. This period also saw Trump’s attempts to reshape U.S. alliances and restructure trade relations.

Under Joe Biden, there was a measure of continuity. He aimed to counterbalance China but kept diplomatic guardrails to avoid escalation. During his tenure, the Indo-Pacific strategy became multidimensional, encompassing security, economic, digital, and people-to-people dimensions.

Under the security pillar, some of the important developments included the signing of the AUKUS pact, the elevation of the Quad to summit level, and modernisation of traditional regional alliances. On the economic front, initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), under the G-7, reflected Washington’s attempts at offering alternatives to China’s influence.

However, Trump’s return has cast a shadow over all areas of U.S engagement. His tariff war has not spared Asian partners, and there are still no clear commitments on IPEF. This is in stark contrast to Cold War times, when America deliberately served as the main buyer of Asian exports to strengthen security partnerships. Trump has made it clear that this strategic policy is over, and economic ties with Asia must now thrive on their own merits. 

Trump’s “America First” agenda shows how economics cannot be separated from security. When the U.S appears to be an unreliable economic partner, its credibility as a security guarantor also suffers. His open disdain for NATO and Ukraine, even as they each face Russian aggression, raises fears that Asian allies might face similar neglect. If Washington walks away from Europe’s defence, what stops it from doing the same in Asia?

Signs of this are already visible. In NATO-style fashion, Asian allies face unfriendly pressure to increase defence spending. The Trump administration has even pressed allies to clarify their security commitments if a conflict between the U.S and China were to break out in Taiwan.

Rather than deepening engagement with Australia to advance AUKUS, Trump kept the pact under review until recently. He has yet to confirm his participation in this year’s Quad summit in India, with which his ties remain strained.

During Pax Americana, small nations could rely on America’s security guarantees because potential aggressors believed U.S. intervention was certain. Today, with that credibility eroding, hostile powers sense weakness, like sharks smelling blood in the water. As Thucydides famously warned, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” 

In the emerging multipolar order, they face risks of coercion from regional powers seeking spheres of influence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s provocative moves in the South China Sea are early signs of this shifting order. Taiwan faces a greater danger, and American allies, including Japan and South Korea, are more exposed than ever.

IS UKRAINE THE FUTURE OF ASIA? 

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, then-Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio warned, “What we are seeing in Ukraine today could be what is in store for East Asia tomorrow.” He argued that accepting Russian expansionism would undermine the post-Cold War principle that borders cannot be altered by force, thereby emboldening Chinese territorial ambitions in Asia.

That the second Trump administration, in its early days, took an accommodative stance toward Moscow’s geopolitical goals, halted military aid and intelligence sharing, and encouraged Ukraine to accept territorial loss in return for peace, alarmed U.S. allies and was widely seen by experts as a betrayal, both on the battlefield and in diplomacy.

Trump’s early efforts to negotiate with Putin over the heads of European allies left Asian allies guessing: What prevents America from doing the same with China at their expense?

What exacerbates the situation for Asia is that, unlike Europe, where institutional buffers such as NATO and the EU exist, Asia’s security rests on bilateral alliances, which are far more vulnerable to Washington’s shifting policies.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy warned of a future where “ 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons”. His prediction did not come true, largely because of the U.S nuclear umbrella. By providing extended deterrence to allies, Washington reduced incentives for nuclear proliferation. 

Under the nuclear deterrence theory, credibility matters as much as capability. If allies doubt America's willingness to climb the escalation ladder, extended deterrence weakens, and revisionist actors may feel emboldened. It is evident from the fact that China is rapidly expanding and modernising its nuclear stockpile.

After decades of maintaining only a minimal nuclear capability, China is on a quest to attain an arsenal equivalent in strength to the U.S and Russia. In just five years, it has doubled its number of warheads to 600, and is estimated to reach 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. 

That Trump might revive nuclear talks with Pyongyang only adds to U.S. allies’ concern. This loss of trust in U.S commitments by Japan, South Korea, Australia, or even Taiwan could reshape their nuclear calculus. This leaves these nations facing a tough choice: develop their own nuclear weapons or accept vulnerability. 

Take South Korea as an example. This debate has particularly intensified in Seoul over fears of Pyongyang’s expanding nuclear arsenal. In 2022, North Korea adopted the law on policy on nuclear forces, containing an aggressive nuclear doctrine.

Since 2022, North Korea has launched more than 100 ballistic missiles (including 13 ICBMs), marking an unprecedented level of provocations. In response, Seoul has declared nuclear weapons a policy option, an idea that now has public backing, where nearly 70% of citizens support independent nuclear deterrence. 

Japan is also reformulating its defence strategy. In 2022, Japan revised its National Security Strategy (NSS), signalling a significant shift from “security pacifism”. It has proposed increasing its defence budget to 2% of its current GDP. Although the Japanese public is firmly opposed to acquiring nuclear weapons, the debate around nuclear deterrence is growing, given that Japan is assumed to have a “latent nuclear weapons capability”.

In this shifting landscape, the divide between nuclear and non-nuclear states is set to become more pronounced and dangerous, increasing the risk of regional arms races, accidental escalation, miscalculations, and nuclear proliferation. 

WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE REGION?

For America’s allies, the lesson is sobering. They must prepare for an era in which U.S commitments are uncertain, and the responsibility of stabilising the region falls more on their own shoulders. A secure Indo-Pacific will depend on building independent strategies while deepening cooperation, and not expecting Washington to do everything.

This will require increased interdependence between regional powers. India, with its growing political will and location at the heart of the Indian Ocean, can position itself as a stabilising power. As Indo-Pacific capitals seek strategic autonomy, multipolarity, and multialignment, which are also India’s foreign policy goals, closer alignment seems inevitable.

The regional security architecture may evolve through the formation of new mini-multilaterals and stronger ties with NATO, which is already seeking closer collaboration with Asian allies to enhance deterrence against Chinese aggression. At the same time, nations are pushing for defence indigenisation and building multiple security ecosystems, independent of the U.S, similar to Europe’s “Rearm Europe” initiative.

Increased cooperation among Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, and Southeast Asian states is also visible through joint defence projects, maritime exercises, and infrastructure investments. For instance, Japan's OCEAN Initiative aims to translate its Indo-Pacific vision into concrete mechanisms of defence collaboration, maritime security coordination, and capacity-building, with ASEAN at its core.

CAN THE U.S. STAY SECURE BY DOING LESS?

Trump’s recent three-nation Asia visit and his Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s emphasis on “peace through strength” in the Indo-Pacific offered some reassurances to allies. During his visit, Trump signed a plethora of new trade and investment deals with Asian allies, signalling that the US is not retreating from Asia. 

However, the visit was overshadowed by the Trump-Xi meeting. Their bonhomie and his reference to G2 signaled its unique significance. Trump shifting his gaze from the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts to Indo-Pacific was especially welcome, as foreign policy experts hoped the swing through Asia might encourage the administration to finalise and announce its China policy and Indo-Pacific strategy. But Trump’s Asia policy still lacks clarity. 

For many in Washington, this new approach of treating alliances with contempt, rooted in the belief that the U.S does not need them, risks ceding leadership to China. Ironically, Trump’s actions have led allies to view Beijing as a more friendly and predictable partner. This ambiguity in U.S policy has already opened a strategic window for China. 

For instance, Trump's decision to skip the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit gave Xi the centre stage. Beijing positioned itself as the predictable champion of free and open trade, as Washington embraces barriers and bilateral deal-making.

Countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam are now turning to China to hedge against the unpredictability of U.S policies. Indonesia has joined BRICS, while Malaysia and Vietnam have attained partner-country status and are exploring deeper engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Hence, a post-American Indo-Pacific with such makeshift security arrangements could turn fragile, fragmented, and destabilising. Nobody, including Washington, would be better off. The price to pay could be a world with a renewed arms race, more countries with nuclear weapons, and a U.S with fewer commitments, but no more secure.

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BY GARIMA ARORA

TEAM GEOSTRATA

info@thegeostrata.com