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India’s Bet on Washington - Trump or Kamala?

India and the United States’ relationship has always been one for the books. It is a partnership pivotal in maintaining international security and order. Historically, both nations have strategic interests that have converged and diverged with each other – which makes this a developing and complex partnership.


sing the top two contenders of the US Presidential elections Kamala Harris and Donald Trump along with current US President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi depicting how important are the two contenders for India and what they bring to the table for the bilateral relations

Illustration by The Geostrata


With the U.S. elections coming up this November 4th, New Delhi faces a pressing question: Who is better for India? Donald Trump or Kamala Harris?

While both administrations impacted India-US relations in more ways than one, taking a more analytical approach towards understanding the pros and cons of each is essential before concluding.


Additionally, understanding which style of American government, Republican or Democrat, aligns with the goals India plans to accomplish in this decade requires going back in history to see what a winning result for either party might mean for the future. 


Historically speaking, the Cold War was a very difficult period for India-US relations. It complicated their relationship because India’s repudiation of the idea of aligning itself with either America or the Soviets, especially at the beginning of the Cold War, led to an independent stance no one could influence.


India adopted a policy of non-alignment, which translated into India not being a close partner of either the US or the Soviet Union, at least until the Cold War ended in 1991. This, however, led to India having a defined start to its relationship with the US. 


The reason India felt alienated from the US in the past is because of the latter’s engagement in bloc politics with Pakistan, which led to obvious tensions with India. The military assistance provided by the US to Pakistan was observed to be a factor in New Delhi’s opinion of Washington.

But India-US relations improved post-1991 when India transitioned to a market-led economy and the bilateral relationship was supported by shared national interests in security, economy, defence, energy, etc. However, India’s 1974 Pokhran-I Nuclear Test created tensions between the two nations.


This looming threat included India entering a nuclear arms race with Pakistan and ending up with India being accepted as a de facto nuclear weapons state. After a few years of reconciliation efforts,  the landmark 2005 Civil Nuclear Agreement under the leadership of Republican American President George W. Bush was signed. 


As previously stated, India and the US have always been in a complex relationship, and with the Trump-led US it is unpredictable, to say the least since India found itself to be a closely aligned partner but not an ally. While the first meeting between Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi and US President Mr Donald Trump did alleviate some differences through discussions on trade relations, and promoting bilateral relations.


However, the main point of convergence was China’s rising power and their cooperation to combat the “China dream” – preventing Asia from being dominated by any single power is something both nations have always agreed on because China’s capacity to dominate the Asian continent serves neither American nor Indian interests.

For the US, the key purpose of an India-US relationship is to enhance its position with other Asian states while avoiding China as a rising power while New Delhi wishes to expand its national power through international cooperation. 


A point where Indian and American priorities diverge is India’s preference for multipolarity and autonomy with Trump’s unapologetic unilateralism, especially when it comes to China. India’s refusal of the United States voluntary arbitration in most cases is a staunch example of the same. While India and the US are not allies in the same way that the latter is with other NATO members or with Japan and South Korea, they still have a uniquely intimate relationship.


This includes extensive defence and security policies (Indo-Pacific and QUAD), cooperation in energy sectors, education, technological innovation, space missions, governance, etc. The two global powers have gotten relatively closer due to certain similarities in their equation with China. However, that is not the only reason it is well within the US national interest to maintain a strong relationship with India, especially if it wants to forge a strong geopolitical equilibrium in Asia.


This relationship could change significantly irrespective of which party wins the US Election, and their differences in approach also showcase the differences between India and US’ respective relationships when either side is in power. 

This compels us to look at significant dissimilarities between Republicans' and Democrats’ approaches to foreign policy because Republicans, as viewed under Trump or Bush, are observed to prioritise bilateral trade and defence agreements with India, highlighting a visible preference for transactional and immediate partnerships. Also apparent in India’s cautiousness regarding US-China relations, is because it centres around the apprehension of the US one day altering or flipping their China policy. 


This raises questions about long-term reliability and how domestic pressures could change Trump’s stance on other geopolitical agreements that don’t align with his unilateral “America First” strategy. His nationalist stance and focus on fiscal policy led to an increase in trade between the US and India, growing from US $118 billion in 2019 to US $146 billion in 2022.


The defence and security policies around that time, with agreements such as LEMOA and COMCASA, highlighted the administration’s intentions to deepen India-US collaborations in the field. The US also emerged as a key supplier for India’s defence equipment in 2020, with deals costing around $3 billion, which also fit well with India’s ‘Make in India’ approach. However, even throughout the pandemic, the bilateral trade volume remained high. 


In contrast, Democrats have followed a more multilateral stance, which is a policy that India has adhered to in the past as well.

However, this approach seeks to take a more cautious approach towards strategic partnerships, unlike the Republicans. Kamala Harris, now standing for the US Presidential Elections after taking the reins from current President Joe Biden, could bring a very different influence to India-US relations. This is also partly due to her Indian heritage and progressive values that resonate with the Indian diaspora. As such, Harris has done little to highlight her association with her Indian heritage.


Scholars regard her not visiting India as a Vice President as symbolic of her not bringing any special cultural nuance or connection to India-US relations. But the Democrats’ pattern of prioritising human rights could very well end up being a double-edged sword for India. 



One thing, however, that both administrations have in common is their interest in the Indo-Pacific, also due to China, and the international collaborations that come with it. Some state that Harris’ exposure to the field of foreign policy is limited as compared to that of Biden but so was Trump’s when he first came to power.

With Biden-Harris, one can say that defence trades under the Democrats have shown an upward trajectory with $25 billion in India-U.S. defence deals. So, while both Harris and Trump may share consensus about improving their country’s relationship with India due to geopolitical rivalry with China, economic and trade benefits, and the Indian diaspora in the country – there is a difference in the prioritisation of human rights issues.


However, critics consider a Harris administration as being a perfect replacement for the Biden administration is an unlikely bet because of the potential lack of personalised and policy-oriented interest people expect from the Harris administration and what they saw in the Biden and Trump administrations. 


Trump’s attitude and stance against China support his relationship to New Delhi. Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi’s first visit to the U.S. actually coincided with the Doklam standoff between India and China in 2017, which included public statements made by the US in favour of India. This gave India an assurance about Washington’s stance regarding India-China relations, which is coincidentally a huge part of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy.


In comparison, Harris would support Democrats' coalition-building approach, also observed with former Mr Barack Obama and Biden.


The Trump administration’s primary goal, unlike Obama’s “rebalance to Asia” policy, is to keep the U.S. as the top power in Asia. For India, the U.S. wanted to be the “net security provider” in the Indo-Pacific because of its importance in international trade. 

Trump officials encouraged the sale of F-18 and F-16 fighter jets to India and also finalised the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) to promote military cooperation. Trump also initiated a 2+2 ministerial dialogue with India in 2018 to encourage bilateral ties.


Trade and immigration policies are hugely important aspects of India-US relations because Trump and Harris’ objectives differ when it comes to this, with “America First” creating restrictions for Indian workers in the US to get work permits and Democrats supporting immigration will generally work towards making these permits more accessible.


While Trump’s recent claims about granting US-educated Indians more work visas are against his usual stance, there hasn’t been much action in the past to support this stance. This relationship with the Indian diaspora may be important when it comes to voting because Indian-American voting patterns are hugely impacted by the government’s approach to India-US relations. Over 65% of Indian-Americans voted for the Democratic Party in 2020. 


India’s relationship with the US in terms of foreign policy includes the fact that while both candidates bring their strengths to the table, trying to decide who would be best is complex. Trump’s approach to foreign policy bolstered India’s position in the Indo-Pacific and promoted their collaboration in the field of defence and security.


Harris’ coalition-oriented approach and background could initiate more cultural ties; although this is not something most scholars are sure about. Her continued stance on India’s domestic policies may create some friction with the government. 

Overall, determining who is best for India is a complicated phenomenon. Trump’s direct approach aligns well with India’s position against China but risks overall unpredictability, versus Harris potentially continuing Biden’s streak for a multilateral approach leading to that administration creating friction with the Indian government. Regardless of who takes office, the next US administration will change India-US relations for years to come. 


 

BY NAVYA SRIVASTAVA

TEAM GEOSTRATA


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5 comentarios


Who's good for India ?

Well Answered !

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India's primary focus will always remain at leveraging the Indo-US bilateral ties.

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Interesting take, will have to wait and see to who benefits India.

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Must-read

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Raj Laxmi
Raj Laxmi
03 nov

Well analysed piece

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