Situated strategically in Europe, Türkiye has played a major role in the war in Ukraine conflict as an impartial liaison between the two parties. While still regulating Western interests in Ukraine, it has managed to balance the Russian side out by acting as a conduit of dialogue and diplomacy.
Illustration by The Geostrata
Turkey has largely avoided involvement in the western sanctions on Russia since the beginning of the conflict. This is acceptable to both sides of the conflict due to Türkiye's advantageous geographical location.
Türkiye interfaces with the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea and is close to key Ukrainian Black Sea ports such as Mariupol and Sevastopol. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Sevastopol has been highly contended to be important for Russia’s maritime interests in warm waters since all the strategic points on its own coast freeze over in the winter. Further south, the Mediterranean Sea serves the same purpose for Moscow while also being an access point to its partners in West Asia.
One fundamental factor in Türkiye's external conflict policy is its relationship with the European Union. Two of its neighbours, Greece and former Soviet ally Bulgaria, are full members. It enjoys extensive economic ties with the western coalition while also maintaining a hold over its own interests, sometimes at the cost of deterioration of its western ties.
But more importantly, Türkiye has been a full-time member of NATO since 1952 and has the second-largest military standing in the organisation after the US. This is the biggest driver of its policy, and throughout the conflict, it has managed to stay off Russia’s list of unfriendly countries despite its significance in NATO. Prominent members of this list include the US, the UK, and the EU, apart from the obvious inclusion of Ukraine.
Restraint from participating in sanctions on Russia has been Türkiye's position since 2014. Amidst antagonism from other European members, Russia has found Türkiye welcoming of its business interests, both locally and geopolitically. Much to the chagrin of the West, these business and trade partnerships have carried forward through turbulent times in the late 2010s.
The most notable case of this balancing act is the TurkStream natural gas pipeline that runs from the Krasnodar region in southern Russia to the Turkish town of Kıyıköy on the Black Sea coast. It is the second natural gas connection between the two countries, the first being the Blue Stream, which was commissioned in 2005.
The TurkStream's most significant characteristic for Moscow is its ability to bypass Ukrainian land. Türkiye is an important hub for Russia’s European supply network in this regard. However, President Erdogan has constantly stayed on the Western side of the equation when it comes to military support for Kyiv.
While vowing never to fully ‘accept’ Russia’s occupational actions in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, Türkiye has also played a major role in securing the Black Sea ports. It now acts as a centre for dialogue between the West and Putin, serving as the only European partner to not completely exclude Putin since the 2022 invasion.
Within the structure of Türkiye's strategic foresight, the restoration of stability stands as its prime objective. Türkiye's interest in Ukraine stems from its profound advocacy for the liberation of Crimea, annexed by Russia in February 2014. Central to this has remained Turkish support for the Crimean Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group subjected to adversaries under Russian rule. Even so, Türkiye's foreign policy has always been characterised by a nuanced and multifaceted approach.
This may have at times conflicted with its Western and NATO allies. Particularly, Türkiye's procurement of the S-400 missile system from Russia exemplifies its adherence to asserting an independent foreign policy.
Amidst the ongoing conflict, Türkiye consistently tries to fill the role of mediator, facilitating crucial agreements to address humanitarian concerns and foster diplomatic dialogue.
Attempts like brokering the Black Sea grain deal and leading the talks of a successful prisoner-of-war exchange between both adversaries epitomise Türkiye's proactive engagement in conflict resolution efforts.
The recent meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Turkish President Erdogan in Istanbul on March 8, 2024, symbolises yet another landmark in diplomatic efforts, particularly amidst the escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine.
Türkiye has offered to host the first round of a peace summit in Switzerland to give a middle ground to both parties and also foster the discussion of conflict resolution through diplomatic channels. This comes amid numerous offers from Ankara to host peace talks through the Turkish medium since the beginning of the conflict.
This prelude occurs against the backdrop of impending local elections in Türkiye, with President Erdogan indicating it will be his last term in office. The steadfast support of the voters for Türkiye's autonomous policy highlights the people’s unwavering belief in the nation’s commitment to a prudent democracy. This provides President Erdogan with a chance to amplify Türkiye's global position while capably managing to address the intricacies of the ongoing conflict.
BY KHUSHI Y. AND ADHITYA BHARGAVA
TEAM GEOSTRATA
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